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Abstract 
 
This thesis will briefly outline the developments in refugee regulation in both Europe and 
Denmark, but will focus specifically on the continuous restrictions made to the refugee policy in 
Denmark during the previous decade. Based on two qualitative interviews, as well as statements 
made by leading Danish politicians and political parties, the research will discuss the incentives 
behind the restrictions as well as their necessity.  
 
The hypothesis of the research is that these restrictions are predominately based on a general 
fear, amongst politicians as well as the public, for the possible consequences refugee flows have 
for a society as the Danish. This should especially be seen in relation to Denmark being a small 
and homogeneous welfare state. With inspiration from Peter Høilund’s book, the law of fear, this 
hypothesis will be examined and also it will be analysed, how the restrictions introduced 
correspond with Denmark’s obligations under international law.   
 
The main points of the thesis is that regulation based on fear makes it acceptable for politicians 
to breach general principles of law, as is the case with the refugee regulation. That the 
developments have led to a significant decrease in the general protection of refugees and asylum 
seekers, and finally that the disregard for international law by European countries, such as 
Denmark, threatens the legitimacy these countries hold as human rights advocates 
internationally. Ultimately, this sends a wrong message, to the less democratic countries that 
they wish to share the refugee burden with.    
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has grown substantially since the Rome treaty established the 
European Economic Community in 1957, both in size and in its role as a world player. The EU 
now consists of 27 member states with Bulgaria and Romania being the last to join in 2007. 
When the European Community began back in the 1950’es, many Europeans migrated from 
Europe to especially the US in search of better fortune. Europe was at that time recovering from 
the wounds of WWII, and the European Community was mainly created in an effort to build 
peace between the former combatants (www.europa.eu).  
 
Since then a lot has changed. Today the EU is a major player on the world scene, both politically 
and economically, and this means that Europe itself is now attracting a large number of migrants. 
In the 1960’s the migrants were a welcomed help for the growing European economy. However, 
as time progressed, the need for migrant workers decreased and the focus was instead shifted to 
the problems some of these migrants caused in local communities. This meant that immigration 
rules were progressively tightened, and access to the EU became increasingly difficult for non-
Europeans. Especially during the last couple of decades, Europe has become more and more 
difficult to access, especially for people coming from developing countries.  
 
Undoubtedly one of the catalysts behind this is the fact that immigration has become a politicised 
problem, meaning that politicians also draw attention to the problems as a means of increasing 
their popular votes. In countries such as Denmark, Holland and Austria it is according to the 
politicians now a war on values, meaning that some of the immigrants undermine the values that 
these societies are based on. The immigrants in these countries, especially those of Muslim 
belief, are for this reason seen as a potential threat to those national values, and it has become 
about, how these western democratic values are best protected against the both internal and 
external threat, currently materialised in the form of Islam (Jung 2006: 11ff). 
 
This has also become visible through the uprising of nationalist right wing parties that have 
experienced a rapid increase in their number of votes and national influence. These parties vary 
in each country, but have in common that they are nationalistic and they believe that Islam is a 
threat to western democracies (Guibernau 2010: 10ff). The rise of these parties has also resulted 
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in greater attention being brought to immigration issues and the legislation regulating this being 
tightened substantially.  
 
1.1 The example of Denmark 
As in other European countries also Denmark has undergone a dramatic change in its 
immigration policies during the last decades. In the 1960’es the country was known for its 
lenient immigration policies (Mikkelsen 2008: 34). During the 1990’es however, immigration 
problems reached the top of the political agenda and it became a decisive factor in the 2001 
election, where the Liberal-Conservative coalition government won with the backing of the right 
winged Danish People’s Party (Knudsen, Pedersen & Sørensen 2009: 20f). Since the election in 
2001 numerous restrictions have been placed on immigration as well as the requirements for 
obtaining permanent residency and naturalisation. Even though the same development has 
occurred in the other European countries as well, Denmark is now considered to have one of the 
strictest immigration policies in Europe (Freedom House 2009). This development is also 
reflected in the country’s refugee policies, an area in which Denmark has transformed from the 
country with the most humanitarian policy in Europe, to now having one of the strictest. 
 
Although Denmark today has strict immigration and refugee policies, the country was the first to 
sign the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the Refugee Convention). 
The Refugee Convention is from 1951 and came only 3 years after the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), and it is thus one of the earliest United Nations (UN) documents on 
Human Rights. The convention was drafted at the request of the Economic and Social Council, 
who felt that it was necessary to create a legally binding document, that incorporated Article 14 
and 15 of the UDHR, which reads as follows: 
 
Article 14 
• (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. 
• (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
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Article 15 
• (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
• (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change 
his nationality. 
(The Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 
 
When the convention was drafted in 1951 it focussed on the issues that were important at that 
time, which means that it was important that the convention did not in any way “challenge the 
sanctity of the sovereign state” (Shuman & Bohmer 2010: 6), and that it was mainly designed to 
protect European refugees (Shuman & Bohmer 2010: 6). This has resulted in certain limitations 
in the phrasing of the Convention, which gives the states a large degree of interpretational 
freedom in the wording. The result of this is that in conjunction with the negative focus on 
immigration, it has also become increasingly difficult to achieve refugee status in European 
countries such as Denmark. The meaning of refugee is not a fixed term, and thus the eligibility 
criteria required to receive protection under the convention progress over time (McAdam 2007: 
198). 
 
1.2 Focus of the thesis 
Already Denmark’s strict policies have violated both international and EU law in specific cases, 
most recently with the controversy relating to the many stateless people who had been denied 
citizenship, although they were entitled to it under international law. The controversy was only 
heightened by the discovery of the fact that the illegal practice of denying them citizenship had 
been going on for more than a decade, and the now fired Minister of Integration, Birthe Rønn 
Hornbech, had been aware of the problem for at least 18 months before informing the 
Parliament. This again sparked the ongoing debate about EU and UN involvement in national 
immigration and refugee regulation, and the newly appointed Minister of Immigration went as 
far as stating that some UN Conventions are ridiculous and it is time to review, whether 
Denmark should continue being party to a convention that forces Denmark to “give citizenship 
to criminal foreigners” (Pind 2011).  It would thus seem as though there is a shift in the political 
attitude towards internationally established rules and laws, and that international laws can be 
challenged, when it comes to protecting the nation state from unwanted immigration. The claim 
of this thesis will be that this shift in policy has to do with protecting the sanctity of the Danish 
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welfare state from an external threat, in this case refugees. This is similar to the developments 
seen in especially Western societies in relation to terrorism, where human rights have been 
disregarded in certain cases to protect national security. This development has inter alia been 
addressed by the Danish Professor of Law and Social Science, Peter Høilund, in the book the law 
of fear (Frygtens ret), which will be presented in the following chapter.  
 
The repercussions that the strict immigration policies can have on the refugees in Denmark as 
well as the general conditions of asylum seekers, and especially rejected asylum seekers, have 
already been heavily criticised by organisations such as the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), Amnesty International, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) and the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). Especially the indefinite detentions 
of rejected asylum seekers, amongst them previous torture victims and people with mental 
disorders, and the almost impossible requirement embedded in the immigration laws have 
especially been given attention. From the reports published by these organisations there is no 
question, that the negative focus on immigration and the continuous tightening of immigration 
and refugee policies have serious consequences for a vulnerable group such as refugees and 
asylum seekers. Especially the most traumatised of these who suffer from mental illnesses, such 
as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), face many obstacles in their desperate struggle to 
rebuild their lives in a new country as Denmark. Also, it is important to consider what 
consequences these continuous restrictions to refugee policies in Denmark have for the 
protection of the involuntary migrants. 
 
These reflections lead to the following research question, which will also be the focus of this 
thesis:  
 
1.3 Research Question 
Are the continuous restrictions of the Danish refugee policies based on a fear for the viability of 
the Danish welfare state and what consequences do the restrictions have for the protection of 
involuntary migrants?  
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1.4 Overview of the thesis 
Chapter 1 
This chapter is an introduction to the topic and to the research question of the thesis. This should 
give the reader a general idea about the focus of the research as well as a general understanding 
of the topic.  
 
Chapter 2 
This next chapter will present the main theoretical framework of the thesis. This will allow the 
reader to very quickly get an understanding of the overall perspective that should be kept in mind 
while reading. The framework will be based on the book the law of fear by the Danish professor 
Peter Høilund as well as some of the theories he draws on in building his arguments. The chapter 
will be used to give the reader an understanding of how and why basic principles of law can be 
set aside to accommodate specific threats and political aims, without much resistance.   
 
Chapter 3 
This chapter is the methodological chapter and it will thus introduce the main methodological 
choices, which have been made in this thesis. This will include choice of theoretical and 
empirical methods as well as the reliability and validity of the conclusions that will be made. 
 
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter of the thesis will introduce the reader to the asylum procedure in Denmark to 
give a better understanding of how the procedures work, and what is required to be granted 
asylum in Denmark. The chapter will explain under what circumstances you can be granted 
asylum in Denmark, and how the general asylum system in Denmark works. The chapter will 
also describe the most relevant restrictions and changes introduced to the procedure, so the 
reader gets an overview of the specific procedural developments.  
 
Chapter 5 
To give the reader a better understanding of the context of the research question, this chapter will 
give a brief outline of the developments in Europe in relation to refugee policies. It will explain 
why the European countries have developed increasingly more restrictive asylum policies as well 
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as the current measures used to avoid any legal obligations by preventing refugees from 
accessing EU territory.  
 
Chapter 6  
As the fourth chapter, this sixth chapter will also focus specifically on Denmark. The chapter 
will present a brief historical outline of the country’s refugee regulation, and present some of the 
main challenges asylum seekers and refugees can be faced with, after their application for 
asylum has been examined. This will include both some of the problems that rejected asylum 
seekers risk facing in Denmark before their return, as well as some of the obstacles, the refugees 
who are granted asylum face as a result of the restrictive policies in relation to permanent 
residency and naturalization.  
 
Chapter 7 
This chapter is the main legal chapter of the thesis, and it will explain some of the juridical 
aspects of refugee protection. This will include an analysis of the rights and limitations set out in 
the Refugee Convention as well as the role of human rights. The intention of the chapter is to 
discuss the legal repercussions of the restrictive refugee policies in Europe, in terms of the 
protection of refugees, and to give a better understanding of the topic from a human rights 
perspective. This chapter is also used to lead the reader into the next chapter, which is the main 
analytical part of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 8 
This chapter is the main analytical chapter, although there will be analytical elements throughout 
the thesis. The chapter will consist of a general discussion and analysis of the conclusions and 
points made in the previous chapters. The discussion will mainly draw on the theoretical 
framework as well as two qualitative interviews with respectively Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
expert in refugee law and EU immigration policy, and Peter Skaarup, Member of Parliament for 
the Danish People’s Party. The chapter will mainly focus on respectively the rationales behind 
the restrictive policies, the policies in relation to Denmark’s legal obligations and the 
consequences for the general protection of involuntary migrants. The information and 
conclusions presented in this chapter will be used to answer the research question.  
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Chapter 9 
This chapter will present the final conclusion to the thesis and thus answer the research question 
presented above. 
 
Chapter 10 
This 10th and last chapter will reflect on possible additional research and reflections that would 
have been relevant to include, had there been more time and page numbers available. 
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2. Theoretical Framework of the Thesis  
In his book the law of fear from 2010, the Danish professor of Law and Social Science, Peter 
Høilund, describes how law in certain situations can take the back seat to political aims. He 
describes how fear and anxiety can be used as methods to circumvent traditional rules of law and 
separation of power. He is especially focused on how the notion of an undefined threat, such as 
terrorism, creates fear in the population to an extent, where people are willing to give up their 
basic rights in exchange for the government securing their safety. For this reason, the theory can 
add to the research, by giving a broader and more theoretical perspective on how and why the 
interpretation and use of laws can change in order to comply with specific societal needs. A 
hypothesis in this thesis will be, that the legal protection of refugees is increasingly being 
disregarded or avoided in a response to the public, or maybe especially political, fear of 
immigration from third world countries.  
 
2.1 The Law of Fear 
Høilund describes the fear that is present in society today as being not a direct fear of something 
specific, but more a mixture of fear and anxiety. The difference between fear and anxiety is that 
fear is directed towards something tangible, i.e. spiders, a weapon, being attacked. Anxiety on 
the other hand is not directed towards something specific, it is merely a feeling of unease, 
without being able to pinpoint the exact reason. A good example of this current type of fear is 
terrorism. Terrorism is a specific concept, and yet it does not necessarily present itself as a 
specific threat, but is more in the form of a general anxiety in the population, which can be 
affected by for example media or politicians. It does not become an actual fear until a concrete 
threat or attack presents itself (Høilund 2010: 23ff). According to Høilund, this has made fear a 
public instead of a private issue, and it is regulating people’s behaviour in the sense that a 
discourse is created about, what could be perceived as threatening. This in terms result in people 
acting in alignment with these discourses in a form of self regulation, as it would be 
characterised by Foucault (Høilund 2010: 26f).    
 
One of the inspirations for his book comes from Lars Fr. H. Svendsen’s book called fear. In 
Svendsen’s book, modern society is described as a society where fear is highly influential. In his 
view, there seem to be a certain of culture of fear, which has been increasingly present during the 
last decades, but which interestingly enough began even before 9/11.  
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It is very important to understand how fear has today become a powerful political tool, which is 
only exacerbated by the modern media culture. Svendsen describes how the traditional political 
ideologies are absent today, and instead politicians play on people’s fear by pointing out the 
dangerous path of the opposing parties. People buy into this belief as we today live in a world, 
where potential risks are described as being actual risk instead of just being potential (Svendsen 
2008: 19ff). The problem is that there will always be potential risks, and it is thus always 
possible for politicians and the mass media to play on these risks and keep people afraid.   
 
In his book, Svendsen refers to theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Ulrik Beck and Mary 
Douglas, who have all described the fear and risk society, but he still feels that their theories 
cannot describe the present situation fully. The fear in society today is more an all encompassing 
and irrational fear of anything and everything. Again the mass media plays a central role as they 
can turn our attention to these potential risks or threats, and make them seem much greater than 
they actually are, by giving a topic over exposure (Svendsen 2008: 56ff). A good example of this 
in relation to the topic of this research would be the great attention given from both politicians 
and media towards flows of refugees and the problems they can pose for society, when in fact 
the number of refugees actually applying for asylum in Denmark today is much lower than it was 
10 years ago.   
 
The problem is, that with the intense exposure threats at times receive, even really small risks 
become great and likely threats in our conscience. A good example of this was the reaction to the 
high jacking of airplanes on 9/11, which made many Americans afraid of flying and choosing 
their car instead, even though the likelihood of being killed in a car crash is significantly higher 
than dying in a plane crash (Svendsen 2008: 61).  
 
2.2 Compromising law 
The idea of using fear as a political tool is not a new one, and the idea used today can be 
compared to the thoughts of authors as Thomas Hobbes and Niccoló Machiavelli. It derives from 
the ancient notion, that the most effective way for a leader to rule a country is to keep people 
afraid, but without being a tyrant. This way you do not alienate your public but keep them under 
your command, as they will rely on you to protect them against a potential enemy or threat 
(Svendsen 2008: 117ff).  
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Put in a modern day context, this can be compared to the politics carried out in relation to the 
war on terror, most profoundly demonstrated by the US under the Bush administration. By 
carrying out a very strategic campaign around the threat of terrorism, and referring to it as the 
most important war in US history, the Bush administration managed to convince most of the 
American public, that all measures would be legitimate to use in this war. The administration 
even managed to convince about ¾ of the public that Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi nationals 
were directly involved in 9/11, thus legitimating the attack on Iraq to protect the US citizens 
from a serious terrorist threat (Svendsen 2008: 128ff). As Svendsen describes it: 
 
“Fear is used as a tool for social control. That, which causes the citizens’ fear is not just the 
terrorists that live at some unspecified location, but also the public information about, how 
dangerous these terrorists are. This information is thus used to justify different measures used to 
ensure the citizens’ safety.” (Svendsen 2008: 127).  
 
The basis of this idea is thus that fear is used as a measure to exert public control and to 
legitimate certain actions used against a threat, such as terrorism. This is also a development seen 
in Denmark, as it will be described in the following, which will focus on the specific theory of 
Peter Høilund and the law of fear. 
 
2.3 Law of fear in relation to Denmark 
This is also the powerful dynamics that Høilund describes in his book, i.e. that this play on fear 
is extremely powerful. Because of this power, the law of fear differs from traditional law in the 
sense that it is often pushed through the Parliament much faster, which leaves little or no room 
for the political public. Although the policies passed are not necessarily popular, they are often 
still passed with no or little opposition (Høilund 2010: 48f).  
 
In his book, Høilund describes how the law of fear affects the perception of legality in the sense 
that today some basic rules of law have been circumvented, as a response to specific fears. A 
good example of this is the Tunisian law in Denmark, where two Tunisians were suspected of 
plotting to kill the Danish cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard, in 2008. The two men were 
subsequently expelled from Denmark on the basis of evidence held by the national intelligence 
agency, the PET. One of them, Slim Chafra, has remained in Denmark because of the non-
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refoulment1 rule. The controversy in this case is the fact that, the evidence held by PET were 
kept confidential, and hence neither of the two defendants could contest the evidence, although 
general rules of law states that a defendant shall have access to the evidence brought against him. 
In December 2010, almost three years after the men were first arrested, the Danish High Court 
annulled the expulsion of Slim Chafra, stating that the defendant did not have the opportunity to 
defend himself properly, since he was denied access to the evidence brought against him, which 
inter alia goes against the principle of a fair trial as stated in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Danish Constitution 
(Høilund 2010: 116ff). In relation to the High Court’s decision, the head jurist, Jacob 
Mchangama, of the independent Danish think tank CEPOS2 stated that, this should be seen as a 
victory for fundamental rights and freedoms, and that the decision is a symbol of how the content 
of some of the regulations passed by Parliament has changed significantly (Ritzau 2010). 
 
It seems that with this law of fear, the institutions have almost unlimited powers, and they can 
introduce very controversial measures without being questioned. A few people may speak up, 
but the vast majority keeps quiet, leaving the government with almost a ‘card blanche’ in 
regulatory power. Høilund describes the situation as comparable with a state of emergency, 
where a threat needs to be tackled immediately, and where the population lose their individuality 
and becomes a mass, that is willing to give up democratic values and civil liberties in order for 
the government to provide safety and security (Høilund 2010: 21ff).  
 
The general point in Høilund’s theory is that by accepting this development, we are also 
accepting giving up fundamental rights, liberties and values, which are the basis of a democratic 
society. For this reason, the law of fear can be viewed as a threat to modern democracy, and 
Høilund therefore argues that it is important that we do not just accept these changes blindly and 
without question (Høilund 2010: 13pff). 
Although Høilund mainly focuses on the threat of terrorism, and the laws and regulations that 
have been passed as a consequence of 9/11 and the Mohammed Cartoons in Denmark, his theory 
is still very applicable in the field of refugee regulation as well. The argument of this thesis is 
                                                            
1
 Non-refoulment is a principle in international law, which protects refugees and aliens from being returned to a 
country, where they might be subjected to torture or such forms of treatment that threaten their life or well-being. 
2
 Centre for Political Studies (CEPOS) is an independent and liberal Danish think tank that works to protect the 
liberalist values in society.  
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that the same rationales, which have led to the circumventing of general principles of law to 
protect the public from the threat of terror, are also used in refugee regulation today. The law of 
fear in relation to refugee regulation is instead based on the fear of a threat towards national 
identity and especially protecting the viability of the Danish welfare state, even if it requires 
circumventing international law.   
 
This theoretical framework should thus be kept in mind when reading the following chapters 
describing the general development of the refugee policy in Europe and Denmark. Also it will be 
used as a theoretical framework in chapter 8, which will present the final discussion of the topic. 
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3. Methodology 
In this third chapter, the most important methodological choices, which have been made 
throughout this research, will be explained. The chapter will account for the choice of theoretical 
perspectives, and how these will add to the research. Also it will be explained, why the main 
empirical data is collected in the form of two qualitative interviews and how these will be used in 
relation to the theory.  
 
3.1 Why the focus on Denmark? 
As described in the introduction, it is not only Denmark who has restricted its immigration and 
asylum policies, instead this development must be seen as a general theme in all the European 
countries. For this reason, many of the problems discussed in this thesis could most likely also be 
found elsewhere, and are not unique to Denmark. There are however several reasons why this 
thesis will focus on Denmark specifically.  
 
As I am a Danish national and I live in Denmark, it is easier for me to access information about 
the specific situation in the country compared to other countries in Europe. It also means that I 
already have a general knowledge about the regulation in the country. Personally, I am also 
inspired by an interest in what I perceive to be a dangerous development in our approach to 
refugee regulation as well as by my academic background in human rights, which has given me a 
general knowledge about the regulation mechanisms of international law. I believe human rights 
should be a fundamental part in all legal regulation, and that disregarding basic human rights, 
compromises the principles that any democratic society should be founded upon.  
 
For this reason, I find it interesting that Denmark has gone from being seen as a very 
humanitarian country in relation to its refugee policies, to now having one of the strictest refugee 
policies in Europe. This development makes the country a good case example of what 
consequences this can have for the influence of human rights and for the protection of 
involuntary migrants.  
 
Besides the reasons listed above, focusing on one county specifically gives me the opportunity to 
acquire more in depth knowledge about the topic and touch upon more details, as the research 
field is limited. Furthermore it means the research will be more specific and accurate, as it will 
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not be based on general information about European countries, as there are still important 
differences and variations between these.  
 
3.2 Conceptual clarification 
Involuntary migrants: The term involuntary migrants covers the group of refugees and asylum 
seekers, who are forced to leave their home country because their lives or well being is 
threatened, unlike the voluntary migrants who choose to come to seek a better life and not as a 
necessity to survive. In real life the differentiation is naturally not as clear cut as described 
above, this differentiation should merely be seen as a way of clarifying the term.  
 
Asylum seeker: An asylum seeker is a person who arrives in a country to apply for asylum, but 
who have not been given refugee status, either because their case has not been decided or 
because they do not meet the requirements of the Refugee Convention.  
  
Refugee: A refugee is a person who has been granted refugee status by one of the contracting 
parties to the Refugee Convention. The term will however also be used as a more generic term 
referring to people fleeing their country.  
 
3.3 Choice of theory 
The theoretical standpoint of this thesis will not be based only on one specific theory, although 
the theoretical framework described in the previous chapter should be considered the main 
theoretical perspective. Instead different theories will be applied depending on the focus of a 
paragraph, and these will be used to give the reader a theoretical insight and understanding of the 
discussions and conclusions, which are made in the chapter.  
 
3.3.1 Theoretical field 
The main academic paradigms of the theories will be within the field of Social Science, Political 
Science and Law. The main theoretical perspectives used will be Peter Høilund, as described 
previously, but also the theories of Axel Honneth will be used as it will be described in the 
following.  
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3.3.2 Axel Honneth  
The German philosopher and sociologist Axel Honneth is famous for his theory on the 
importance of recognition, which will be used in this thesis. According to Honneth’s theory, 
recognition plays a fundamental part in our human development, and it is the foundation for 
developing a healthy and full identity. In Honneth’s view, if an individual is not recognized as 
being the person that he or she feel that they are, by both their close family and society, they will 
not be able to achieve the good life. in Honneth’s view, this means that if the involuntary 
migrants do not feel that they are recognized by the Danish society and by the government, e.g. 
by having the same rights and possibilities as other people in similar situations,  it will have 
consequences for their possibilities of achieving a good life in the future (Honneth 2004: 358). 
Honneth’s theory is a normative theory about relations between different groups in society, and it 
will thus never be possible to achieve that level of recognition in reality. However, this does not 
mean that there is not a valid point in considering the consequences a lack of recognition from 
especially the Danish state towards involuntary migrants could have. Honneth’s theory will for 
this reason be used as a perspective that the reader should keep in mind when considering the 
consequences that the state policies may have on the self image of involuntary migrants.  
 
3.4 Choice of empirical method 
The empirical research used in this thesis will be based jointly on official reports and documents 
by acknowledged international organisations, as well as two qualitative interviews, respectively 
an interview with the Danish expert on Refugee Law and EU immigration policy, Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, from the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS) and an interview 
with the Danish Member of Parliament, Peter Skaarup, chairman of the legal committee of the 
Danish Parliament as well as the spokesperson on legal-, immigration- and integration affairs for 
the Danish People’s Party.  
 
3.5 The qualitative interview 
The reason why qualitative interviewing will be used in this thesis is that with this method, it is 
possible to gain in depth knowledge about the interviewees’ experience and point of view in 
relation to the topic (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 1). This is especially due to the fact that it makes 
it possible not only to ask questions, but also to ask follow up questions in relation to their 
answers, and thus gain knowledge that could not have been gained by using a quantitative 
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method. Also, for the purpose of this thesis the necessary quantitative data is available in the 
reports that will be used.  
 
3.5.1 Expert Interview 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen is one of the leading experts in Denmark within the field of refugee 
regulation. His main field of research has been within the areas of refugee law, European 
immigration policies and issues of sovereignty. For this reason he is a very useful source, and his 
great knowledge in the field is instrumental for this research. The fact that his research field is 
not limited to Denmark but that it also extends to the rest of EU means, that his knowledge can 
be used in a broader perspective, as well as in relation to the general developments in EU 
policies.  
 
3.5.2 Political interview 
In addition to the expert interview, also an interview with the Danish politician, Peter Skaarup, is 
included. Skaarup has been a member of the Danish People’s Party since 1998. Given that he is 
the legal-, immigration and integration spokes person of the party in Denmark that most strongly 
argue in favour of restricting access for foreigners, especially those from third world countries, 
he is an ideal candidate to argue in favour of the development. This means, that he is especially 
relevant in the discussion of why restrictions are made, if they are necessary and what it is we 
need to protect ourselves from. He will thus be used as a form of opponent in relation to the 
expert interview, although the two interviews should not as such be seen as equal representations 
of two counter points in the political debate. 
 
A different approach could have been to also include interviews with people who work directly 
with the involuntary migrants, or to carry out interviews with the involuntary migrants 
themselves. However, as this thesis focuses specifically on the political- and legal aspects of the 
topic, including such interviews would require adding a whole other perspective to the research. 
This has not been possible given the limited time and page numbers available.  
 
3.5.3 The interview situation 
To accommodate the busy professional life of the two interviewees, both interviews were 
conducted in the private office of each of them, and were scheduled to last between 20 and 30 
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minutes. The interview with Gammeltoft-Hansen ended up lasting 49 minutes as he had more 
time than expected, whereas the interview with Peter Skaarup had to be limited to 20 minutes 
due to the ongoing 2020 negotiations in the Parliament at the time. This was however enough 
time to get his perspective, and it does for this reason not affect the findings of the thesis. Also 
Peter Skaarup’s opinions and perspectives will be substantiated by statements made by other 
relevant politicians as well as political statements taken from the website of his party. 
 
Another advantage of conducting the interviews in the private setting of the interviewees’ offices 
is that it makes the interviewees more comfortable during the interviews, and allows them to 
speak more freely and openly about the topic, thus giving added value to the research (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009: 128f). The topic of this thesis is not of a particularly sensitive nature for the 
two interviewees, but it must still be presumed that being in a familiar environment has a 
positive effect.  
 
Since the intention with the interviews has been to get an insight into the specific knowledge and 
opinions of the two interviewees, semi structured interviewing has been used as a method. This 
means that the interview guides3 consists mainly of an “outline of topics to be covered, with 
suggested questions” (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 130f), but that the interviewer has also asked 
additional questions and were not bound by the guide in any way, which allows for the 
conversation to run as freely as possible. 
 
3.5.4 Transcription of the interviews 
In the transcription of the interviews a method called condensation has been used4. This means, 
that some smaller sentences, words and pauses have not been transcribed, but without the 
original meaning of the sentences being compromised (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 205ff). The 
reason why some of these words are left out is only to make the sentences more clear and 
comprehensible, so it is understood for the reader even though, he or she was not present during 
the actual interview.  
 
                                                            
3
 The interview guides can be found in Appendix 3. 
4
 The transcriptions can be found in Appendix 1 and 2. 
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In addition to this, it should be noted that both interviews have been conducted in Danish, as it is 
the native language of both interviewees as well as the interviewer. Conducting the interviews in 
Danish, as opposed to English, makes the conversations run more fluently and does not put a 
language barrier on the scope of the conversation. This also means, that the citations that will be 
used from the qualitative interviews have been translated from Danish to English. In relation to 
the translations, emphasis has been placed on making as accurate translations as possible, while 
still maintaining the original meaning of a sentence. At times small adjustments have been made 
to the wording in the citations, to ensure the meaning remains as precise as possible 
 
3.5.5 The empirical research in relation to the theoretical framework 
The two qualitative interviews will be used to test the hypothesis of the thesis, in terms of the 
law of fear being applicable to refugee regulation. The interview with Peter Skaarup will thus 
mainly be used to analyse, whether the restrictions made to the Danish refugee policies are 
founded in a general fear of the threat refugee flows can pose to the Danish society. The 
interview will also be used to uncover the view on the position of international law, and the 
legitimacy of the refugee convention as a regulatory framework for refugee control. The 
interview with Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen will be used more generally to discuss the position 
of international law today, the relationship between the Danish refugee policies and the country’s 
international obligations, as well as the consequences the current refugee regulation have for the 
protection of involuntary migrants. 
 
3.6 Reports 
In addition to the qualitative interviews, the research will also rely on empirical data from 
official reports published by acknowledged international organisations, mainly the ECRE, the 
UNHCR, other UN agencies, the Danish Refugee Council, the International Rehabilitation 
Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), DIIS and DIHR. All organisations are very experienced and 
esteemed organisations working within the area of refugees and human rights, and their 
published findings must for this reason be considered to be reliable. 
 
3.7 Reliability, validity and generalisations 
As the information and conclusions in this thesis is based on official documents published by 
respected international organisations as well as two qualitative interviews, with people 
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representing different sides of the spectre, the research must be considered to be both reliable 
and valid. Even though it can be questioned, whether the findings would be completely the same 
had another person carried out the research, it is still likely that they would be similar, as much 
of the empirical research is based on official reports and findings by the leading organisations 
working with the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Denmark.  
 
It should of course be kept in mind that all involuntary migrant are different. They have different 
backgrounds, different cultures, different experiences etc., and for this reason it is difficult to 
make generalising conclusions on how they experience the Danish policies. There is however no 
doubt that many involuntary migrants are traumatised from the horrible experiences they have 
had, experiences that have forced them to flee and start over in a new country. Being traumatised 
makes them more vulnerable, and it will undoubtedly affect their mental state, which must make 
it more difficult for them to meet the requirements set forth in parts of the Danish immigration 
and refugee legislation. For this reason, it is possible to conclude on general indications of 
regulations that are likely to have a negative effect on a large group of involuntary migrants due 
to their vulnerability.   
 
In relation to the topic of this thesis, it would be possible to draw parallels to the general 
developments in Europe. It is however not the intention to imply that the findings would be valid 
in all EU countries, it should merely be emphasized that similar developments in the area of 
immigration and refugee regulation is taking place all over Europe. For this reason, some 
tendencies found in this thesis will likely also be present elsewhere on the European continent, 
which should be considered while reading the research. The focus of this research will be 
specifically on Denmark for the reasons listed above, but the conclusions presented later in the 
thesis should not necessarily be viewed as isolated and country specific scenarios.   
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4. Applying for asylum in Denmark 
This chapter is designed to give the reader an overview of how the asylum process works in 
practice. It will outline the general procedures and explain, on which grounds it is possible to be 
granted asylum in Denmark. This short chapter will give the reader a brief introduction to the 
Danish asylum system as well as present some of the recent changes, which have had an impact 
on the rights and protection of the applicants.  
 
4.1 The normal procedures 
The first step of the application procedure is always deciding whether or not the Danish 
authorities are responsible for reviewing the application, or if the responsibility lies with another 
state as decided in the Dublin Regulation5. After that, most applications will be reviewed under 
what is called the normal procedure. This means that the immigration service will review the 
application, and if they decide on a rejection, it will be referred to the Refugee Appeals Board 
(Flygtningenævnet), who will make the final ruling.  
 
The Refugee Appeals Board (RAB) is an independent quasi-judicial body, i.e. it is not a court 
but it has some judicial powers, and it was established to secure proper appeals opportunities for 
rejected asylum seekers. It was established in 1983 as a part of the new Aliens Claims Act, at the 
time the most liberal immigration law in Europe. Back then, the RAB consisted of 7 members 
(One Judge, who was also the President of the RAB, three members appointed by respectively 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, one member of 
the Danish Bar Association (Advokatrådet) and two members of the Danish Refugee Council) 
(avisen.dk 2007). 
 
In 1985 a new procedure was introduced, called the manifestly unfounded procedure, which 
excludes certain applicants from having their application referred to the RAB. Under this 
procedure the immigration Service does not consider the applicant to be eligible for asylum after 
reviewing the application. These cases are referred to the Danish Refugee Council (Dansk 
Flygtningehjælp), who then makes a statement on the case. If they agree with the immigration 
service’s decision, the application will be rejected without contest. Only if the Danish Refugee 
                                                            
5
 The Dublin Regulation stipulates that the first EU country entered by an asylum seeker is also responsible for 
reviewing that person’s asylum application.  
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Council disagrees with the initial decision can the application be referred to the RAB, who will 
make the final ruling (www.nyidanmark.dk1). 
 
4.2 The legality of the Refugee Appeals Board today 
Since the RAB was established in 1983, it has been reduced to first 5 members in 1995 and most 
recently to 3 members in 2002, which is still the number today. The three members are 
respectively a Judge, a member of the Danish Bar Association and an employee from the 
Ministry of Integration. In addition to the reduction in members, a decision by the Danish 
Supreme Court in 1997 also determined that decisions made by the RAB could not be contested 
by any national court. The national courts only have authority to review any procedural mistakes 
or unlawful estimates, a decision which was criticised for possibly infringing Article 63 of the 
national constitution, which deals with the jurisdiction of the national courts 
(www.bedsteforaeldreforasyl.dk). 
 
In a chronicle from 2009, the Danish Judge and President of the Danish Refugee Council, Stig 
Glent-Madsen, called for a reform of the work of the RAB. In the article Glent-Hansen criticises 
the fact that while the neutrality and legality of the body has decreased with the reduction of 
RAB members, public scrutiny has not been increased, which in his opinion is not compatible 
with the general practice of a traditional court. The RAB is of course not a traditional court, but 
he still argues that it is problematic that the RAB is not held to the same standards as a traditional 
court, as it has decision making powers. 
 
One of the main concerns he raises is that only one member is an actual Judge, and one member 
is an employee from the Ministry of Integration, the same ministry that rejected the initial 
application, which signals a level of partiality to the applicant. In his view, it is interesting that 
the politicians have gone to great length to make sure that judges in the normal courts appear 
impartial and neutral by forcing through a ban on religious symbols, especially the Muslim head 
scarf, while simultaneously accepting that 1/3 of the RAB would seem clearly biased. Also, in 
traditional courts a decision can either be appealed, or in minor cases a joint decision has to be 
made by both jury and Judge, to protect the rights of the defendant. With the RAB however, the 
decision is final and cannot be contested.  
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Another important issue raised by Glent-Madsen is that the RAB is not subject to the same level 
of scrutiny as the normal courts. The RAB stands outside the division of power and is thus not 
subject to the traditional public scrutiny. It is very difficult to bring a case against the RAB to the 
court, and also the Ombudsman has limited authority, as he is only able to review cases on his 
own initiative. In addition to this, both the public and the press have little access to scrutiny, as 
the decisions are made in closed meetings, where neither press nor public has access. 
 
Glent-Madsen’s point is that in a time where concepts as human rights, freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial is advocated by Denmark in relation to other 
countries, the country must review the problems at home as well, e.g. in relation to the work of 
the RAB. In his view, the RAB should thus function more as a traditional court, while still 
maintaining the same level of expertise. This would include greater scrutiny, more opportunities 
for presenting evidence and better possibilities of appeal (Glent-Madsen 2009).  
 
4.2.1 Additional limitations introduced in 2002 
In addition to reducing the members of the RAB in 2002, the government also removed the 
concept of de-facto refugees6, which means that today asylum seekers, who are not covered by 
the Refugee Convention, can only be granted residency in Denmark, if they instead are protected 
by other International Conventions that Denmark has acceded to, i.e. people who risk the death 
penalty or risk being subjected to torture or inhumane and degrading treatment 
(www.nyidanmark.dk2). Also the rules for family reunification was restricted in 2002, meaning 
that refugees are now not entitled to reunification with their family, they instead have to meet 
very strict requirements, which will be described in chapter 6. 
 
4.3 Additional ways for asylum seekers to be granted residency in Denmark 
Besides going through the normal procedure, there are additional ways for asylum seekers to be 
granted a residence permit in Denmark. This for instance applies to asylum seekers, who have 
special professional qualifications that are coveted in Denmark, and which are listed on a so-
called positive list of desired qualifications. The same apply if an asylum seeker has been offered 
a highly paid job, which meets the requirements of the pay limit scheme (www.nyidanmark.dk3). 
                                                            
6
 The term de-facto refugee refer to persons who are not covered by the Refugee Convention but who for similar or 
other heavily weighing reasons are likely to be persecuted in their home country, and who could thus be granted a 
residence permit in Denmark before the change of policy in 2002. 
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4.3.1 Quota refugees 
Since 1978 the Danish state has set aside a fixed amount of the national budget to accommodate 
a certain number of refugees residing in refugee camps outside of Denmark, following an 
agreement with the UNHCR. Since 1989 the quota has been fixed at 500 refugees per year, 
however following a change in policy in 2005, the quota is now 1500 refugees in three years to 
allow for a certain level of flexibility. In 2005, the requirements for selecting the quota refugees 
were changed, and they are now selected within the following three categories: 
 
1) On the basis of the geographical region of their origin. 
2) Because they are critically ill and in immediate need of treatment. 
3) If they are in immediate danger of being returned to their homeland or of being subjected 
to ill treatment in their host country, i.e. the urgent cases. 
(www.nyidanmark.dk4) 
 
By far the majority of the refugees are selected within the first category, and only very few are 
selected on the basis of the other two categories. With the change in 2005 it was decided that the 
refugees selected under the first category should be selected on the basis of an assessment of, 
whether they would be granted asylum if they had applied in Denmark, and on the basis of their 
possibility of integrating in the Danish society. This integration potential is assessed in relation 
to their educational background, work experience, network, family situation, age and motivation. 
According to the DIHR, this practice has seriously damaged Denmark’s reputation within the 
UN, as it means the country no longer chooses the refugees on the basis of refugee law and the 
need for protection, as was previously the case.  Instead other aspects are now considered, for 
instance religion, which according to DIHR is evident by the fact that the percentage of selected 
refugees from Muslim countries have fallen from 84 % in 2001/2002 to 11 % in 2006/2007 
(Fogedby 2008). 
 
4.3.2 Humanitarian Residence Permit 
A final way of being granted a residence permit is on the basis of humanitarian considerations. 
This is not done often, and the Danish Parliament has decided that this should be applied as an 
exception and not as the rule.  
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In assessing this type of application, the Ministry will consider the personal situation of the 
applicant, e.g. if the person suffers from serious physical or mental disabilities and if there are 
small children involved. If the person suffers from a serious medical condition, which could 
warrant a humanitarian residence permit, it is assessed whether or not the applicant can receive 
the necessary medical treatment in the home country. If this is the case, the Ministry will reject 
the application in almost all cases. 
 
Also this procedure has been tightened. Previously the assessment was not based on, whether 
medical treatment was available in the home country, but on whether or not the applicant in 
practice would have access to such medical treatment. It was thus not sufficient for the treatment 
to be available, if the applicant did not have the physical, mental or financial resources to receive 
the treatment, he or she would still be eligible for a residence permit for humanitarian reasons.  
(www.nyidanmark.dk5) 
 
4.4 Conclusion of chapter 
As it is shown in the above it has become much more difficult to be granted asylum in Denmark. 
This is true both for the refugees who apply under the normal procedures, but also the ones who 
fall under other categories. At the same time, the legitimacy and legality of the RAB, who 
handles many of the applications, has decreased. For this reason, the position given to the RAB 
can and should be questioned, as its decisions cannot be challenged in a national court and it is 
not subject to public scrutiny. These developments combined signify that the legal rights of 
refugees, and subsequently their protection, have become increasingly limited.  
 
To understand why it has been made so difficult for refugees to be granted asylum in Denmark, 
it is necessary to be aware of the context that has led to these changes. This will be the focus of 
the following two chapters. 
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5. A European development 
As described in the introduction of this thesis, Denmark has undergone a dramatic change in its 
attitude towards refugees, which is heavily reflected in its national policies and laws. This 
development is however not unique to Denmark, but should be understood as part of a general 
European development, as it will be described in the following. The chapter will also use 
different theoretical perspective to explain, why these developments have occurred.   
 
5.1 Solution to a problem 
Before the 1970’es, the European countries generally had a liberal approach to immigration and 
asylum policies, but an increase in especially the level of asylum seekers at the time forced the 
European states to react by tightening their policies. Initially this was done in a unilateral way, 
where especially the Western European countries introduced asylum policies during the 1970’es 
and 1980’es, which made it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to be granted asylum. At the 
same time restrictions were also placed on what rights and benefits refugees were entitled to, 
once they had settled in the country (Santel 1995:82). The effort to stop the influx of refugees 
did not have much effect at the time, since many asylum seekers, who had been rejected in one 
country, simply tried again in a different country, creating what became known as ‘refugees in 
orbit’ (Santel 1995: 82). This meant, that the problems with refugees escalated to a point, where 
within a period of 20 years, from the early 1970’es to the early 1990’es, the number of asylum 
seekers in Europe increased times 50 (Santel 1995: 75).  
 
In recognition of the failure of the unilateral approach, the European countries started developing 
a common Europeanised asylum policy in the early 1990’es. This was done both to create a 
coordinated effort in limiting the refugee flows, as well as to prepare for the abolition of border 
controls between the EU member states after the Schengen Agreement (Santel 1995: 82f). 
During this period, a lot of pressure was put on the European border countries, such as Italy, 
Spain and Greece to strengthen their policies, which led to the adoption of the Dublin Regulation 
(ECRE 2008: 1). The Dublin Regulation established specific rules that define which country is 
responsible for handling an asylum application. With the Dublin Regulation, the country first 
entered by the asylum seeker is also responsible for handling the application, unless special 
circumstances warrant otherwise. 
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5.2 Intercepting the problem 
A more recent development in the way the EU tries to limit refugee flows, is simply by 
preventing the refugees from reaching the EU territory. Every year, the EU invests millions of 
Euros in collaborating with neighbouring countries in North- and West Africa, in an effort to 
stop the many boat refugees from reaching EU territory. The reasoning behind this practice, is 
that it has become increasingly difficult to control the migrant flows at the border. In addition to 
this, under international law the states are in principle obliged to “allow entrance for any person 
presenting an asylum claim at their borders or within their territories, until the validity of that 
claim has been examined.” (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 6). Also, the non-refoulment rule set 
forth in the Refugee Convention does not apply until the refugee is within the jurisdiction of the 
state in question. This means, that the obligation can be avoided by the EU states if the refugee 
never reaches EU territory. This practice is a form of ‘juristiction shopping’, where states exploit 
the fact that, international law has not yet managed to bridge the gap between state sovereignty 
and the increased internationalisation in fields such as refugee regulation (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008: 11ff).  
 
In terms of the protection of refugees, this is a serious issue as the boats are often returned to 
countries that do not have the same level of rights and protection as the EU states. These 
countries often allow the EU to operate in their national waters, and thus assume primary 
responsibility for the refugees either under threat of sanctions or because of financial gain 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 14f). The interception of refugees inside the national territory of 
third states also has the consequence, that persons fleeing directly from these states cannot be 
considered refugees in terms of international law, as the Refugee Convention clearly states that 
the law only extends to persons outside their country of nationality (The Refugee Convention).  
 
5.2.1 Rescue missions 
Lately, some of the missions described above have been referred to as rescue missions aimed at 
securing the safety of the many refugees, who risk their lives on the perilous journey towards 
Europe. An important aspect in these missions is that calling it a rescue mission means, that it is 
allowed to board a boat sailing under another country’s flag, and thus under another country’s 
jurisdiction. It also means, that it falls under the cooperation agreements made concerning these 
missions, which can provide a framework to shift human rights and asylum obligations onto third 
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states. According to these agreements “the State in whose zone the operation takes place holds 
main responsibility for ensuring that distress calls are responded to and, importantly, allow 
disembarkation.” (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 25). 
 
The main problem with this development is, that it gives the EU a possibility to define the 
interceptions as either rescue missions or immigration controls depending on, where the boats 
are intercepted. This means, that it has become a very efficient system for diverting asylum 
responsibilities to third states, where the protection is often lacking or non-existent. 
 
5.3 Why has this development occurred? 
There are several explanations behind the policy changes described above, which will also be the 
focus of the following paragraphs. Whereas the above has been a descriptive review of the 
developments in Europe, the rest of the chapter will apply a more theoretical and analytical view 
on the processes behind these developments. 
 
5.3.1 The securitisation of refugees  
A key aspect in the development in refugee policies in Europe is that the refugees started being 
seen as a security problem.  
 
“Once turned into a security problem, the migrant appears as the other who has entered (or who 
desires to enter) a harmonious world and, just by having entered it, has disturbed the harmony.” 
(Huysmans 1995: 59).  
 
As explained in the quote above the refugees became securitized, meaning that they were seen as 
a threat by the habitants in the European states, as people who disturb the order or harmony that 
has existed before. Previously, a threat was something that would always be directed at the 
nation state, but in recent years this has changed. Today we increasingly focus on threats that we 
believe disrupt some form of national identity instead, an identity which is often defined by what 
is threatening it. In this sense, the national identity is not a static entity, but something which 
develops and is defined in relation to what is perceived to be threatening it (Huysmans 1995: 
55ff). As described in the theoretical framework of the thesis, it is a powerful tool for politicians, 
when something is perceived as a threat by the public. This gives the politicians very free hands 
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in terms of introducing restrictive measures in order to “keep the public safe”. The securitisation 
of refugees is thus a pivotal part of the political and regulatory developments in the European 
states. 
 
The Danish Professor of International Relations and co-founder of what is popularly referred to 
as the Copenhagen School, Ole Wæver, has written extensively on the concept of securitisation. 
In his view, one of the reasons why this securitisation process can even occur is the end of the 
Cold War, and thus the end of a bipolar world order. According to Wæver, this means that the 
security situation of the world is no longer defined by the competing interests of two super 
powers, which has resulted in a change in the regional view on security. In relation to Europe, 
this has led to a stronger focus on maintaining and improving integration between the European 
states and a focus on external threats (Wæver 1995: 396ff). At the same time, this development 
seems to have sparked the creation of a national identity, which overrules the traditional notion 
of statehood, which could be seen as a transition towards post modernity (Wæver 1995: 405 ff). 
In Wæver’s view, the post modernity has not, as expected, led to an instability between countries 
or a ‘clash of civilisations’ as Huntington argued, instead is had led to a securitisation of forces 
or groups that stand out from the majority in a region, such as it is the case with the ethnic 
minorities in Europe. It has become these groups that are perceived as threats, as they are the 
ones going against some form of national identity, which is what needs to be protected today, 
instead of the national territory as previously (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 473ff). 
 
5.3.2 Defining a national identity 
This new form of national identity is, according to the cultural sociologist Peter Duelund, also a 
result of globalisation and should be seen as a response to the multicultural society. In several 
European countries, e.g. Denmark, Holland and France, defining a national identity has been 
used by the politicians in direct combination with an approach to multiculturalism and 
immigration policies (Duelund 2011: 1ff).   In both Holland and Denmark cultural canons have 
been created, which describe the most important historical, cultural and artistic developments in 
the countries. In Duelund’s view, these efforts “illustrate how governments are endeavouring 
through public cultural policies to implement different paradigms and interpretations of identity 
in society.” (Duelund 2011: 3). Duelund describes a dangerous development in the national 
identity formation, where cultural unity is in focus, exacerbating the differences between us and 
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them. These changes can unfortunately lead to a shift from a focus on equality to treating people 
differently because of their difference (Duelund 2011: 6).   
 
This perception of national identity, or people hood, can be especially strong in smaller nation 
states, such as Denmark. The reason behind this seems to be that the political processes in 
smaller countries have developed within more confined and protected national models, which 
can make the public’s fears of what is different, and possibly disruptive, even more significant 
(Delanty, Jones & Wodak 2008: 12). This is especially caused by globalisation, which has made 
boundaries, cultures and access to social goods more diffuse terms, and something which is not 
defined by nation states and nationality to the same extent as previously (Delanty, Jones & 
Wodak 2008: 12f). As a result, anxiety is rising, which is very much reflected in the 
developments of policies and the political rhetoric used today.  
 
As described in chapter two, a general anxiety in the public towards an external threat gives 
legislators very free hands in terms of changing policies. A perceived threat to a national 
identity, or to the sanctity of the nation state, will result in the public being willing to sacrifice 
some of their rights and freedoms, in order for the government to keep them safe.  This can thus 
explain the continuous restrictions to immigration and refugee policies in Europe, as the 
legislators are given almost a ‘card blanche’ in regulating access for refugees, if people perceive 
them as a threat.  
 
5.4 A language of power 
As described in chapter 2, also the politicians bear some of the responsibility, as they can use the 
creation of fear in the public to exert the necessary social control. One of the consequences of 
these negative or securitised discourses on immigrants and refugees, is the creation of “subtexts 
of racial and cultural chauvinism, particularly when confronted with Islam. Europe acquires 
distinction and salience when pitted against the Other.” (Stråth 2008: 32). 
 
In the view of the French sociologist, Michel Foucault, discourses should not be viewed as 
simply being a formation of language, it is a language, which is created by a war of competing 
discourses. In Foucault’s view, the winning discourse is not superior to the other discourses 
because of its content or rational, it is instead superior because the discourse is created by 
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someone superior, someone who holds power in society (Foucault & Gordon 1980: 114). 
National politicians are thus very influential in society because they not only possess a legitimate 
power, which has been established by the introduction of democracy, but to some extent they 
also possess the ability to legitimize discrimination. “For instance, state power may be used (or 
not used) through law and the exercise of administrative and statistical power in such a way as 
to normalize discriminatory or exclusionary practices.” (Burns 2008: 156).  
 
This can for instance explain the rise in national right winged parties that most European 
countries have witnessed. Parties that mainly focus on the problems with immigrants and 
refugees as a way of increasing their vote count. These parties often portray themselves as 
defenders of a national culture, which the ‘others’ are threatening. This development has also led 
to a proliferation in the use of racist statements, but the racist language used is however more 
subtle and thus it has today become part of a general racist or xenophobic discourse, which exists 
everywhere in society. Racism today should however not be seen as a direct form of racism, it is 
instead more expressed in the form of a lack of recognition of the other person, which is felt 
especially by people with a very dark skin colour, or people who stand out by wearing visible 
religious symbols, which are different from the religion of the majority. It is “the construction of 
‘differences’ on many levels, which serve ideological, political and/or practical discrimination 
on all levels of society.” (Delanty, Jones & Wodak 2008: 3). 
 
5.5 Rights 
As explained above, politicians have a lot of power and influence in society, and for this reason 
they are also important in defining and deciding the rights, that for instance asylum seekers and 
refugees should have in society. A good example of this power is the fact that the state has the 
power to decide, what is required to gain national citizenship, a permanent residency permit and 
what benefits you are entitled to, depending on your legal status in the country, i.e. are you a 
citizen or not (Faist 1995: 179f). 
 
A very important aspect of the politicians’ power in this case, is deciding who has access to the 
country and who has not. As it has been explained previously, the requirements demanded to be 
given refugee status in Denmark, and other European countries, have been tightened 
substantially during the last decades. This is important when we talk about what rights the 
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asylum seekers are entitled to, because the state has very little obligation to protect asylum 
seekers, who are not granted refugee status. This in practice means, that asylum seekers have a 
very limited amount of rights and entitlements, which to some extent gives the state a large realm 
to manoeuvre in, when regulating the lives of asylum seekers, i.e. in relation to benefits, health 
care, housing, general rights etc. Refugees on the other hand are protected, and they are generally 
given a very similar status to migrants7 (Faist 1995: 181ff). 
 
5.6 Conclusion of chapter 
As described above, the EU has in the recent decades introduced more and more restrictive 
measures with the intention of preventing refugees from being granted asylum in Europe. As 
described in the last part of the chapter, these developments are due to both political priorities, 
general fears in the public and the creation of national identities, which is also consistent with the 
theoretical hypothesis of this thesis, as it is outlined in chapter two. The same developments 
have, as explained previously, also taken place in Denmark, and the next chapter will for this 
reason briefly present the specific developments in Denmark, and identify the measures that 
most affect the situation of involuntary migrants in the country. 
 
  
 
                                                            
7
 More about this in chapter 7 
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6. The refugee policy in Denmark 
This chapter will initially present the recent developments in immigration and refugee policy in 
Denmark. The main focus will be placed on the specific initiatives and policies in the Danish 
immigration laws, which affect the situation and life of asylum seekers and refugees especially 
hard. For the reader to understand the situation that refugees face in Denmark it is important to 
understand and be aware of the developments that have taken place.  
 
6.1 The policy development 
The developments described in the previous chapter are also symptomatic of what has happened 
in Denmark during the same period. As most other European countries, Denmark was in need of 
extra workers in the 1960’es following the economic upswing after WWII. For this reason, 
contract labourers, called guest-workers, were brought to the country during the 1960’es, which 
was made possible by the very lenient immigration laws at that time (Mikkelsen 2008: 36). This 
policy changed however from the early 1970’es, and in 1973 a substantial majority in the 
parliament passed a law to put a full stop to immigration.  
  
The level of immigration continued rising due to family reunification rules, and also the number 
of asylum seekers increased due to a very liberal asylum policy. The increasing number of 
foreigners coming to the country, both immigrants and asylum seekers, became a high priority 
on the political agenda after the election in 1993 (Knudsen, Pedersen & Sørensen 2009: 20). 
After the election in 1993 the topic of immigration received more and more attention from both 
media and politicians, and the issue became instrumental in the election in 2001, where the 
Liberal-Conservative coalition regained the power with the support of the right wing nationalist 
party called the Danish People’s Party, who had managed to win 12% of the public’s votes 
(Rydgren 2004: 474). Since the change of government in 2001, both immigration policies and 
refugee policies have undergone a significant change, making it almost impossible for refugees 
and immigrants to get permission to reside in Denmark today.  
 
6.2 The humanitarian asylum country 
With the refugee policies, the limiting of entry possibilities came much later than it did with the 
immigration policies. In fact, in 1983 a new law was passed to further improve the legal position 
of refugees in Denmark, which included giving refugees a legal right to obtain a residence 
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permit, improving their legal status during asylum procedures, as well as establishing a 
possibility of appeal if an application for asylum was denied. In addition to this, the law also 
maintained the principle, that everyone who came to Denmark to apply for asylum would have 
their application reviewed, even if they came without documents (Kjær 2003: 18). Because of 
the very liberal content of this law, the policy received international attention, and at this time 
Denmark developed a reputation as an example of a humanitarian approach to refugee 
regulation. 
 
6.3 The current situation for refugees in Denmark 
As with the immigration policy, the refugee policy has been tightened substantially since the 
change of government in 2001. Today, Denmark has one of the strictest policies in Europe, and 
the country has been heavily criticized for its asylum policies by the major human rights 
organisations. The continuous tightening of asylum policies since 2001 has had a great impact on 
the number of applicants received in Denmark. In 2001 12.512 applied for asylum, however by 
2007 this number had plunged down to 2.226, and the number has remained low compared to 
most of the other Western European countries (UNHCR 2010: 1). 
 
In 2005, the Platform for European Red Cross Cooperation on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants (PERCO) published a country update on the situation in Denmark. At this point 70 % 
of the asylum seekers in Denmark had been rejected, and many had since been living in asylum 
centres for several years. The main criticism raised in the report, was the detrimental effects 
these lengthy stays have on already traumatized asylum seekers, and the fact that the national 
policies regulating the right to financial benefits, are very discriminatory and problematic for 
both asylum seekers and refugees (PERCO 2005). Both problems continue to have serious 
consequences for asylum seekers and refugees today.  
 
6.3.1 The lengthy stays 
The lengthy stays at the asylum centres is one of the main problems, which have been criticized 
by many national and international organisations. In Denmark there is no maximum limit for the 
amount of time a person can stay at an asylum centre, or in a detention centre for rejected asylum 
seekers. This can potentially place the asylum seeker in a situation of uncertainty for several 
years, if the person either cannot or does not voluntarily return to their home country after the 
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application has been rejected (DIHR 2009: 13f). A good example of this problem, is the many 
rejected asylum seekers from Iraq, who were not able to return to their homes for several years 
because of the situation in the country. Some of them have for this reason stayed in the asylum 
centres for up to eight or ten years, since only families with children, who have stayed in an 
asylum centre for more than three years, are allowed to relocate (www.amnesty.dk).  
 
The cases with the Iraqi nationals received much media attention in Denmark, when the 
government decided to forcefully return many of the Iraqis to Iraq, as they deemed parts of the 
country to be safe. Some of them were so afraid of being returned to Iraq, that they sought refuge 
in a Danish church, which was accepted by the members of the church. The decision had 
however already been made, and in the middle of the night a group of armed police officers 
came and raided the church, and forcefully removed the Iraqis so they could be sent home 
(Kristeligt Dagblad s.a.). 
 
The lengthy stays in the Danish asylum centres are however not the worst scenario that rejected 
asylum seekers risk facing. If they are to be returned to their home country, and the authorities 
decide they are a flight risk, they risk being detained  at the detention facility called Ellebæk. 
 
6.3.2 Ellebæk detention facility 
Organisations such as UNHCR, Amnesty International and the IRCT have all raised concern 
about the way Ellebæk detention centre is used. The main critique has been concerned with the 
fact that also asylum seekers, who have been subjected to torture or have severe mental 
disorders, have been detained there. Also, a time limit has never been set for exactly how long 
the detention can last (Andreassen 2011: 8ff). Every four weeks, the asylum seeker is placed 
before a judge, who decides if the detention should be extended by another four weeks, and this 
can go on for several months, in some cases even more than a year. During the court session the 
Judge and the police representative is present in the court room, while the asylum seeker and his 
attorney are speaking via a video monitor in the detention centre. The trials are scheduled to take 
15 minutes, most cases last less, and in virtually all cases the extension is granted and the asylum 
seeker is detained for another four weeks, and then the process starts over (Andreassen 2011: 
20). 
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This is very stressful and mentally straining for the asylum seekers, since they have not 
committed a crime, and they do not know how long the detention will last. Some of them 
develop mental illnesses, such as PTSD, as a result of the detention, and some even try to 
commit suicide. It is especially traumatic for people, who have previously experienced torture in 
a detention facility, or people who suffer from mental illnesses. Acknowledged organisations 
such as Amnesty, IRCT as well as the former UN Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, 
consider detention of previous torture victims to amount to inhumane and degrading treatment, 
which is prohibited by the UN Convention Against Torture and other cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment (CAT). It has also been argued, that the procedure 
concerning extensions of the detention violates the right to a fair trial, as the asylum seeker and 
his lawyer are not present in the court room, and because the Judges almost always take the side 
of the police, even though a measure such as detention should only be used if it is not possible to 
use less invasive measures instead.  
 
6.3.3 Financial benefits 
Another policy, which has been heavily criticised, is the introduction of the so-called start help 
benefits. The start help is given to people, who are not self-sufficient, and who have not lived in 
Denmark in seven out of the last eight years; the rate given is significantly lower, than the 
standard welfare benefit (kontanthjælp). It was introduced in 2002 to enhance the incentive for 
foreigners to work, as well as to let potential immigrants know, that they could not come only to 
exploit the Danish welfare system (Amnesty International 2007:18). 
 
Now, several years after the system was introduced, it still seems doubtful, whether the measure 
actually has a significant effect on the unemployment level amongst receivers of the low benefit. 
Several studies have shown, that it places people in a situation of poverty, which to some extent 
excludes them from the rest of society. Start help is between 36 % and 55% lower than the 
normal welfare benefits, and the vast majority of the receivers are aliens, both refugees and 
immigrants. This group generally do not have the same social network, resources and position in 
society as the ethnic Danes, and the start help makes it even more difficult for them to change 
this. Studies show, that because they are on such a tight budget, they are not able to pay for 
public transportation to visit friends in other cities, and they are not able to have the same life 
style as the rest of the population. This affects the whole family, as the children often have 
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difficulties understanding why they are not able to have and do the same things as their friends, 
which naturally make their parents feel like they are bad parents (Blauenfeldt, Hansen & 
Johansen 2006: 32ff).  
 
The situation is especially hard for refugees, who are very often traumatized by the experiences 
they have had in their homeland. Many refugees have either physical or psychological trauma, 
and this makes it more difficult for them to actively seek out a job and get off start help. For 
traumatised refugees, it is more efficient to help rebuild their self-esteem and motivation instead 
of offering financial incentives (Blauenfeldt, Hansen & Johansen 2006: 11). The start help can 
for this reason have the opposite effect, as many refugees find it embarrassing and degrading to 
have to find used items at dumps or in containers, because they cannot afford it otherwise. 
Living with as little means as they do, and having to do without the things they feel they need, 
affects the individual’s self-esteem and identity, and can very well move them further away from 
the work marked instead of closer. They simply end up lacking the motivation and energy to 
change their position (Blauenfeldt, Hansen & Johansen 2006: 11ff).  
 
As described in the methodology, receiving recognition by society is very important for the 
development of a full personality, according to Axel Honneth. This means, that a person must 
both receive recognition in the sense of having the same legal rights as other members of society, 
as well as being recognised as a contributing and a worthy member of society (Honneth 2004: 
358). Not being entitled to the same financial benefits as the ethnic unemployed Danes, and not 
being able to lead the same life as the general public, can thus have a detrimental effect on the 
life of this group. They are excluded from having the same rights and possibilities as others, and 
their wellbeing and spirit suffers because of this. If they are sick, they cannot afford to pay for 
transport to the hospital, they cannot afford new clothes if they have a job interview, and they 
spend so much energy just trying to survive with the benefits, that they are quickly drained of 
energy to pursue a better life (Johansen, Højland & Hansen 2011: 189ff). According to Honneth:  
 
“The justice or wellbeing of a society is measured according to the degree of its ability to secure 
conditions of mutual recognition in which personal identity formation, and hence individual self-
realization, can proceed sufficiently well.” (Honneth 2004: 354). 
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In Honneth’s view, the policy used in this case towards newcomers, such as refugees, is a sign of 
an unjust society, as it does not secure possibilities for mutual recognition of different groups. 
The overall problem is, that if a group is not given genuine recognition, they will not be able to 
pursue a good life and take on the responsibilities they are given, which in term affects the 
wellbeing of the whole society (Honneth 2007: 339).  
 
6.4 The quest for permanent residency 
Once the asylum seekers have been granted refugee status, they are given a temporary residence 
permit. This is of course a relief, as it means that they will be safe at least till the permit expires 
and they have to apply for a renewal. At the same time however, it is also a very frustrating and 
mentally straining situation for the refugees not to know, if they will be forced to return to their 
homeland some day, if their residence permit is not extended. The continuous tightening of the 
immigration policies since the election in 2001, has not only made it more difficult to access the 
country, but has also made it more difficult, and for some people impossible, to achieve 
citizenship and to be able to claim the same rights and benefits as the ethnic Danes.  
 
Through the years, more and more emphasis has been placed on duties and working actively to 
gain the right to the welfare benefits, under a form of quid pro quo principle, culminating with a 
new point system introduced in 2010 for immigrants and refugees that want to obtain a 
permanent residence permit (Mouritsen et al. 2009: 28). With the new system, it is possible for 
the well integrated immigrants to obtain permanent residency already after four years, instead of 
the previous seven years, by gathering 100 points through fulfilling specific criteria. The criteria 
for achieving the 100 points include inter alia having been employed full time for two and a half 
years out of the past three years and passing a level two Danish exam, which is equivalent to a 
9th or 10th grade level (www.nyidanmark.dk6). 
 
The problem with this new system is that it makes it almost impossible for the traumatised 
refugees to fulfil the requirements, and thus to get permanents citizenship (Ersbøll & 
Christoffersen 2010: 12). 
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6.4.1 The traumatised refugees 
Studies show, that around 30 % of the refugees who arrive in Denmark are traumatised by the 
experiences they have had in their home country. This means that they have difficulties in 
following the obligatory language courses and to hold down a job (Danish Refugee Council 
2009: 1ff). Even if the refugees are awarded early retirement, due to invalidity from e.g. PTSD, 
they are still not exempted from all of these requirements, unless their mental state is severe 
enough for them to be protected by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. According to UNHCR, this effectively means that the most vulnerable refugees will 
not be able to acquire permanent residency, as it will simply be impossible for them to fulfil the 
criteria, which is very problematic as the permanent residence permit is a precondition for 
obtaining naturalisation (UNHCR 2010: 2). This also means, that the most vulnerable refugees 
can never achieve complete stability in their new country, as their stay is only based on 
temporary residency, which they cannot be sure to have renewed. This also effectively excludes 
them from the rights accompanied by naturalisation, such as the right to vote and the full 
protection of the state.   
 
6.5 Family reunification rules 
The difficult requirements set to obtain permanent residency in Denmark also put refugees at a 
disadvantaged position in relation to family reunification, as permanent residency for at least 
three years is a prerequisite for obtaining this. Others include having adequate living space, 
being able to support oneself as well as the spouse and the posting of bank-backed collateral of 
DKK 63.413,39. Also, specific requirements must be fulfilled by the spouse 
(www.nyidanmark.dk7). For refugees suffering from the effects of traumatic experiences, this 
must be considered impossible to achieve, which again adds to the instability of their lives. As 
they are refugees, they must be afraid for the wellbeing of the family, if they still live in the 
home country. Also, it makes it impossible for them to really rebuild a new life in Denmark, if 
their children and spouse cannot be a part of that life.  
 
6.6 Conclusion of chapter 
As in the rest of Europe, the situation for refugees and asylum seekers in Denmark has become 
increasingly difficult during the recent years. It is impossible for many of them to ever achieve 
permanent residency with the current rules, and some of them end up spending years in asylum 
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centres or being detained indefinitely, which can have serious effects on their health. The new 
measures make it almost impossible for the refugees to really begin a new life in Denmark, and 
the lack of recognition awarded to them, will likely have serious consequences for their ability to 
achieve a good life.   
 
Looking at the situation described above, it becomes interesting to consider, what type of 
protection refugees and asylum seekers are actually entitled to under international law, and why 
it is possible for Denmark to introduce such restrictive measures. This will thus be the focus of 
the following chapter.  
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7. The protection of refugees under international law 
As described in the previous chapters, it has become increasingly difficult to be granted refugee 
status in European countries such as Denmark. This is a very serious issue as it affects the 
protection the refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to, which will be explained in the 
following. This chapter will briefly present the content of the 1951 convention and after this will 
follow a general discussion of the legal regulation of asylum seekers and their protection under 
international law.  
 
7.1 The Refugee Convention 
The main legal instrument used in the protection of refugees is the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, which entered into force in 1954. The convention was originally drafted 
to make Article 14 and 15 of the UDHR legally binding, as well as to consolidate already 
existing agreements in a manner that would determine the status of the many refugees, who had 
no legal protection at the time.  
 
In drafting the convention, it was important that it awarded more than a minimum level of 
protection to refugees, since otherwise there would not be any reasons to introduce it. However, 
on the other hand it could not be drafted in a way that would establish an ideal level of protection 
either, since this would dissuade many countries from ratifying it (McAdam 2007: 29f). In the 
preamble it reads that the convention aims at assuring the widest possible exercise of rights and 
freedoms, and it has managed to both incorporate civil and political rights as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights. The asylum seekers, who are granted refugee status, are thus entitled to 
a broad range of rights and protection, which inter alia includes rights to housing, work, fair 
trial, adequate living etc. In addition to this, article 33 (1) of the convention also prohibits any 
contracting state from returning:  
 
“a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.” (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). 
 
Before a refugee can be granted this protection, he or she must first be eligible for refugee status 
in a contracting state. As discussed previously in this thesis, the eligibility criteria for refugees 
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have become stricter in many countries, a development which makes it very difficult for 
applicants to achieve the protection awarded to refugees. In Article 1A (2) of the convention it is 
stated that the term refugee shall apply to anyone who: 
 
“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees). 
 
As seen in the quote above, the original convention was aimed at refugees fleeing as a result of 
events occurring before 1951, meaning European refugees that had fled as a result of the 
atrocities of WWII. This time limitation was however repealed in the Protocol that was added in 
1967 (Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees). 
 
7.2 The need for complementary protection 
One of the critiques, which can and has been raised in relation to the level of protection awarded 
by the convention, is the fact that it is phrased in a very general manor, that leaves much freedom 
of interpretation to the individual nation state. The broad phrasing of the convention should be 
seen as a result of the importance of maintaining state sovereignty, and not challenging the 
position of the nation states. If the convention had been drawn up more clearly, i.e. expressing 
very specific obligations being put on the states, it would simply be impossible to convince 
enough countries to ratify it. Another issue which has been raised, is the fact that the convention 
to some extent is outdated, since it was written almost 60 years ago. Not only have the times 
changed since 1951, but so has the reasons for why people flee. A good example is that the 
convention is phrased in a way that mainly focuses on the individual, which means that many 
countries, such as Denmark, interpret it as you personally have to prove that you are at risk of 
being persecuted in your own country. This means, that the convention does not take people who 
are fleeing from hunger, civil war or climate change into account, which is naturally also an 
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expression of when it was drafted. In 1951, the vast majority of refugees, in Europe at least, were 
persons fleeing in the aftermath of WWII. 
 
These issues combined mean, that there are serious gaps in the protection awarded by the 1951 
convention. Although it secures a significant amount of rights and liberties, the main problem is 
the difficulties asylum seekers face in meeting the criteria that countries, such as Denmark, set 
up as thresholds for meeting the convention requirements. These gaps are both the result of 60 
years having passed, and the protection of state sovereignty, but it should also be seen in context 
with the intentions of the drafters in 1951. It is clear, that the drafters hoped that a 
complementary system would be created. As it is written in Recommendation E from the Final 
Act8, the drafters hoped that the value of the convention would exceed the contractual scope of 
the content (McAdam 2007: 26). However, such a complementary system has never been 
established. Instead, the developments in Europe, as outlined in chapter 5, seem to have resulted 
in severe restrictions in both asylum and immigration policies and the use of a very narrow 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention.  
 
7.3 A question of human rights 
The eligibility criteria required to be protected under the 1951 convention is an important issue 
to address, since it has to do with the protection offered to asylum seekers. If you are given 
refugee status, you are entitled to the rights and liberties secured by the refugee convention, 
however as long as you remain an asylum seeker, you have to rely on other protection 
mechanisms, which are very minimal.  
 
“Whereas a grant of Convention status entitles a recipient (under international law) to the full 
gamut of Convention rights (plus any additional entitlements under human rights law), no 
comparable status arises from recognition of an individual’s protection need under a human 
rights instrument.” (McAdam 2007: 199f). 
 
There are certain human rights that always apply, regardless of the individual’s status, which will 
be described in the following. But generally asylum seekers will not be able to rely on human 
                                                            
8
 ”A final act to a treaty provides a formal summary of the conference proceedings, and may also seek to establish 
political, rather than legal, agreement on particular issues or set out matters for future discussion.” (McAdam 
2007: 27). 
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rights. The problem is, that the phrasing used in most human rights instruments is quite vague, 
which makes it relatively easy for states to fulfil their obligations. Also, human rights generally 
refer to the state’s obligations towards its citizens, and thus it can be argued that this does not 
extent to asylum seekers (McAdam 2007: 202f).  
 
This means that there is very little protection secured for asylum seekers, and especially rejected 
asylum seekers, as long as they have not been given refugee status. This is the reason why it is 
highly problematic, when states such as Denmark, make it increasingly difficult to meet the 
eligibility criteria.  
 
7.3.1 A lack of political will 
It is clear today that there is a lack of political commitment to set in place the necessary 
protection for refugees in most of the world. Instead of focusing on building a strong refugee 
system, which awards better rights and stronger protection to the vulnerable refugees, states 
seem more concerned with avoiding these obligations (Hathaway 2005: 998ff). The problem is, 
that this instead puts a strain on the poorest countries in the world, as these are the ones who 
ultimately end up with the refugees, who are denied access elsewhere (Hathaway 2005: 1000).  
 
Through the years, asylum seekers have however successfully brought claims to the courts in 
Europe, which means that there are certain rights and obligations that cannot be contested by the 
nation states. These minimum rights will be described in the following. 
 
7.4 Complementary protection today 
One right, which is always applicable regardless of status, country or situation, is the prohibition 
of torture as described in CAT and Article 3 of the ECHR. The prohibition of torture is a so-
called non derogable right, which means that it is always applicable, under any circumstances. 
For this reason, it is possible for asylum seekers to apply for protection under this right instead. 
In relation to the prohibition of torture, it is for example not allowed to return a person to a 
country, where the person may be subjected to torture or inhumane treatment: 
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“No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.” (CAT, Article 3 (1).  
 
This concept, known as non-refoulment, is also a part of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but as 
written above it also apply to asylum seekers, who have not been given refugee status, because 
of the CAT and Article 3 of the ECHR. The concept of non-refoulment also extends to other 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, and in general it also prohibits countries to return 
someone to a third country, that may afterwards expel the person to the country, where the 
person in question is at risk. 
 
7.4.1 Denmark and non-refoulment 
The rule of non-refoulment is an area where Denmark’s actions and policies are considered to be 
controversial. Denmark is one of the countries that accept diplomatic assurances from countries 
that are known to use torture as an interrogation technique, although: 
  
“The Commissioner for Human Rights, The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, and the 
Committee against Torture have all stressed the inherent unreliability of diplomatic assurances, 
noting that ‘formal assurances cannot suffice where a risk [of torture] nonetheless remains’.” 
(McAdam 2007: 120). 
 
Already there have been cases, where Danish returnees have been detained upon arrival in their 
home country and placed in prisons that routinely use torture methods on prisoners. Denmark has 
been warned against this practice several times by the UN institutions, NGO’s and leading 
Human Rights agencies, and still persons are returned with diplomatic insurances as a guarantee 
of their safety (Amnesty International 2011: 1).  
 
7.5 Conclusion of chapter 
As described above, the developments in Europe and Denmark are a serious issue, as it severely 
affects the rights of refugees if it is made almost impossible to live up to the eligibility criteria 
set by the states to be granted refugee status. The Refugee Convention is, as most international 
legal instruments, phrased in a manner that allows for broad interpretations by the contracting 
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states. The political developments in a country such as Denmark makes it possible for the state to 
choose a very narrow interpretation, making conditions for asylum seekers very difficult at 
times.  
 
The question then becomes, what role does international law play in refugee regulation today and 
is international law able to overcome the fear society, which seems very dedicated in its efforts 
to keep refugees away from its borders. And what is it that we so desperately need to protect or 
be protected from? These questions, as well as the research question, will be discussed and 
analysed in the following chapter.  
 
 
49 
 
8. Final discussion 
Drawing on the previous chapters, as well as the expert interview conducted with Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, the interview with the Danish Member of Parliament, Peter Skaarup, and 
additional sources, this analytical chapter will present a more in depth discussion of the topic, 
and bring the different parts of the thesis together. The main focus will be placed on the threat 
posed by refugee flows to a state as Denmark, the Danish policy in relation to EU and 
international obligations and the role of international law today in relation to refugee protection. 
In conclusion, the chapter will sum up the relevant points, and hereby also make it possible to 
answer the research question in the following conclusive chapter. 
 
8.1 A threat to the state 
As described previously, Denmark has transformed from being known as an exemplary and 
humanitarian refugee country, to having one of the most restrictive refugee policies in Europe. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that this development is associated with a securitisation of 
refugees, and that parallels can be drawn between the law of fear, which was presented in 
chapter 2, and the incentives behind refugee regulation in Denmark.  
 
Based on the two interviews, this hypothesis seems to be valid as both interviewees see the threat 
posed by refugee flows as a determining factor behind the developments in Denmark. As Peter 
Skaarup states, Denmark is in its nature a very humanitarian country, but it is also a very small 
and homogeneous country, which is not built on immigration. In his opinion, this is why a public 
demand for restrictions of the liberal refugee policy from 1983 arose, when suddenly as many as 
25.000 persons started coming to the country each year during the 1990’es due to the liberal 
family reunification rules and refugee policies (PS: l. 13ff). As he explains, this development 
could cause serious problems for Denmark. 
 
“The problem is that we have our welfare state, which is financed through taxes, and that will 
collapse if too many benefit from it, without having paid for it. That is the basic principle” (PS: l. 
148ff).  
 
Interestingly enough, it would seem that the reason why the issue and debate has become 
especially heated in Denmark is very closely linked with the country’s welfare system. The fear 
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of a collapse is even more directly stated in the political programme of the Danish People’s 
Party, where it is written that: 
 
“A continuation of the last decades’ immigration from countries outside the Western culture, 
combined with the often high birth rates amongst immigrants, can during the coming decades 
have far reaching and destructive effects not only on the demographics of Denmark, but also on 
the entire structure and cohesiveness of society.” (www.danskfolkeparti.dk).  
 
As seen in the quotes above, the fear of immigration is not only a matter of national security, but 
a fear that an overflow of refugees or immigrants from third world countries could possibly 
threaten the whole structure and cohesiveness of the welfare society. For this reason, the law of 
fear seems to be very applicable to this topic.  
 
Also Gammeltoft-Hansen sees fear as the main reason for the developments in Denmark. In his 
view, it is a fear of the consequences brought on by globalisation and the changes this leads to in 
terms of national identity, culture, economy etc. In this sense, asylum seekers come into focus, as 
immigration is the most visible consequence of globalisation (GH: l. 49ff). Globalisation is also 
one of the points raised in chapter 5 in relation to the developments in the European 
immigration- and refugee policies. Peter Duelund, amongst others, believes that the increasing 
influence of globalisation has resulted in a strong focus on national identity, as different cultures 
and nationalities are now increasingly being mixed. This focus also leads to an exercabation of 
differences between people, which he finds problematic.  
 
This corresponds well with the statement made by the Danish Minister of Integration, Søren 
Pind, who sees the current situation as a battle for the protection of the Danish values. In Pind’s 
view it is a question of: 
 
“the most profound cultural influence in recent Danish history. And we are talking about a fight 
for Danish culture and the democracy and the shared community, which has characterised us for 
a very, very long time. A community characterised by free spirit, free speech, equality for the 
genders, equality regardless of sexual orientation and much more.” (Pind 20112). 
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In Pind’s view, it is a war between cultures, and Denmark has to fight to preserve its own culture 
and values against the values and culture of the new comers. Pind also states, that he does not 
believe in the multicultural society, as he does not believe that all cultures should be equal. The 
predominant culture in Denmark should always be Danish, and thus any new comer needs to 
adopt this culture, and take on the basic values of the Danish society, to be welcomed (Pind 
20112). 
 
This is also one of the issues raised by Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School. He explains the 
developments with the end of the cold war having shifted the perception of national threats from 
a focus on threats aimed at the nation states onto possible threats posed by groups and people 
that stand out in society, and who could potentially threaten some form of national identity. As 
Delanty, Jones and Wodak describes, the fear of what is perceived to be disruptive to society can 
be especially strong in smaller states, such as Denmark, because the public’s perception of the 
threat and the visibility of the threat becomes more significant. 
 
Based on the statements presented above, it is clear that the general fear of the possible 
consequences that refugee flows can pose to the Danish state is highly influential in the 
regulation of refugee control in the country. This fear seems to be exacerbated by the fact that 
Denmark is a small, homogeneous welfare state, with a high level of legal security in terms of 
general rights, which is seen as an innate part of Danish culture. This societal structure is to some 
extent seen as fragile, which means that it needs to be protected from outside and inside pressure, 
which could compromise its stability.  
 
This corresponds well with the rationales behind the law of fear, as described in chapter 2. The 
politicians and the public view refugees as being a potential threat to the Danish society, and thus 
it is necessary for them to limit this threat as much as possible. 
 
8.2 Necessary with restrictions 
According to Peter Skaarup, the need to protect the Danish welfare society is also the reason why 
it is necessary to have the restrictive policies described in the previous chapters. If Denmark 
allows for too many refugees to access the country, and for instance gain family reunification, 
the consequence could be that Denmark is simply overrun by immigrants, who will eventually 
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take over the country (PS: l. 98f). In addition to this, the future of the Danish welfare society is 
already threatened by an aging population and a decreasing work force, which means that in his 
view, the people who come to the country have to be able to contribute to society, instead of 
adding to the financial burden (PS: l. 100ff). This is also why the start help benefits have been 
introduced, simply because the welfare system would fall apart, if everyone had a right to the 
same benefits as the native Danes from the time they enter the country (PS: l. 116ff). This fear of 
a collapse also explains the ongoing restrictions made to the asylum procedure as presented in 
chapter 4, as well as the strict rules concerning permanent residency and family reunification. 
The two latter restrictions should also be seen in correspondence with refugees being seen as a 
group, that is primarily in need of temporary protection. The priority seems to be to persuade the 
refugees to return to their home countries if this is possible and not for them to build a new life 
in Denmark (PS: l. 52ff). A clear symbol of this view is the most recent proposal presented by 
the government, awarding a cash bonus to municipalities if they persuade some of their foreign 
inhabitants to relocate to their national country.  
 
In relation to the theory of Axel Honneth, the restrictions listed above must be considered to be 
detrimental to the future life of the refugees. Although complete recognition between different 
groups in society is a normative idea, still a basic acknowledgement of refugees being a 
welcomed part of society should be a minimal requirement. However, the restrictions listed 
above clearly sends a message of the opposite, especially the concept of offering financial 
incentives to persuade the refugees to return. Based on Honneth’s theory, the restrictions could 
have serious effects on the future lives of the refugees, as they are not recognised as being equal 
and valuable members of society, if anything they are told the opposite. This way, their stay in 
Denmark can end up contributing to their trauma, which is an issue that should also be 
considered, when considering the necessities of these restrictions. 
 
The fact that the refugees are not welcome in Denmark also became apparent in 2009, when a 
study showed that although the number of asylum seekers had decreased substantially during the 
previous 10 years, the acceptance rate had risen to around 50 %. This made both the Liberal 
party and the Danish People’s Party call for further restrictions.  
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“It is probably not possible to make further restrictions to the law in relation to the conventions. 
But the decisions often rest on administrative discretion. So maybe it is possible to increase the 
requirements placed on asylum seekers to document that they are personally persecuted.” 
(Vesselbo 2009). 
 
An interesting point in the quote above is that it directly shows the willingness to challenge the 
limitations of international law, by exploiting other measures to circumvent it, in this case 
administrative discretion. In relation to the theory of Peter Høilund, this practice also 
corresponds to the developments and dynamics described in his book. It has for example led to 
as many as 46 restrictions being made between 2001 and 2009, which is one every two or three 
months during that period (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Whyte 2011: 160).  Many of the restrictions 
have been pushed through quickly and with a very narrow mandate in the national Parliament, 
even if it at times has contravened with recommendations by the UNHCR, DIHR or other 
acknowledged organisations.  
 
As described in chapter 2 the expedited drafting of new legislation is symptomatic of the law of 
fear, and it also explains, why these laws can be passed despite warnings from acknowledged 
organisations about possible infringements of international laws.  
 
An important factor to consider in relation to the above is that based on the theory of Michel 
Foucault, national politicians are powerful opinion makers, and thus they have great impact on 
the public’s perception of specific issues. If the politicians continue to focus on refugees as a 
threat, and make it clear that they are a problem for the Danish welfare state, this attitude will 
also be reflected in the general public, which will ultimately exacerbate the problems faced by 
involuntary migrants.  
 
8.3 A question of sovereignty 
There seems to also be another reason why refugee regulation, and especially international 
guidelines for refugee regulation, is a highly problematic topic, and that has to do with the notion 
of sovereignty. It goes directly against the traditional perception of state sovereignty, that the 
refugee convention takes away the possibility of states to freely choose, who they will allow 
entrance on their territory (GH: l. 58). As described in chapter 7, state sovereignty is a central 
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issue in international law, and it is also the reason why many conventions, such as the Refugee 
Convention, are often phrased very broadly. In Gammeltoft-Hansen’s view, the issue of 
sovereignty is also why there at times seem to be unwillingness, in countries as Denmark, to 
follow the recommendations of international institutions and accepting judgements by the 
European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
“I can see it as a general trend within the area of human rights, that the states are a bit reluctant 
when different UN committees etc. speak out about concrete cases and such things, uh ah it is 
not binding on Denmark, we want to make such decisions ourselves.” (GH: l. 125). 
 
This also explains why Denmark continuously ignore recommendations made by organisations 
such as the UNHCR, simply because the politicians do not wish to compromise their sovereignty 
on such an important issue, especially since it has become a highly politicised issue.  
 
This corresponds with the opinions of Peter Skaarup, who emphasises that in relation to 
refugees, Denmark should have full authority in deciding, who are allowed to reside in the 
country, whereas internationally the refugee regulation should be handled by the UN (PS: l. 
128ff). He even suggests that all refugees, who are granted a residence permit in Denmark, 
should be selected on the quota trips that were described in chapter 4. In Skaarup’s view, this 
would be more fair as it would be the most vulnerable refugees who would be helped, since they 
are the ones who cannot afford a plane ticket or to pay a trafficker to bring them to Denmark. 
This would also be more just in the sense that these people have often waited in refugee camps 
for years, unlike the asylum seekers that come to Denmark on their own, and who often, 
according to Skaarup, lie about being personally persecuted (PS: l. 33ff).  
 
Although this in principle sounds like an admirable idea, it could be a problematic approach if 
the current criteria for selection is maintained, so only the most easily integrated refugees would 
be selected. This would effectively exclude a large group of refugees, most likely refugees of 
Muslim descent, who are from the very least developed countries in the world. In addition to 
this, it must also be considered to be a dangerous presumption that people who have the 
resources to travel to Denmark cannot be victims of persecution.  
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8.4 The role of international and EU law 
Looking at the statements made by the leading politicians in Denmark, it is very clear that there 
is little support for UN Conventions, such as the Refugee Convention, and for the EU’s ability to 
handle refugee regulation. As stated above, there is a view that Denmark should be able to 
decide, who they allow on their territory, without the involvement of either the EU or the UN. 
Also, several politicians have stated that some of the UN Conventions, such as the Refugee 
Convention, are simply too old and “do not reflect the reality of the world today.” (Pind 20113). 
 
This problem is also raised by Peter Skaarup, who points to the fact that the Refugee Convention 
was drafted in the aftermath of WWII, and was based on the problems between the East and the 
West. However, today the refugee problem is a North and South issue, and the situation is 
completely different than it was 60 years ago, when the Refugee Convention was drafted. For 
this reason, he does not feel that the Convention is useful as an instrument of refugee regulation 
and he too agrees, it does not take into account the reality of the world today (PS: l. 139f).  
 
According to Gammeltoft-Hansen, one of the consequences of this lack of trust in the Refugee 
Convention is, that the politicians often choose to set the bar as low as possible in terms of the 
national regulation, which means that it becomes impossible to avoid violating the international 
laws in specific cases (GH: l. 317ff).  
 
This also corresponds well to the theoretical framework of this thesis, as it demonstrates how 
politicians set aside general principles of law to protect the public from a perceived threat. As 
described previously, this gives the politicians a powerful tool, as they are also part of creating or 
adding to the fear through the statements they make. In this sense, they can create a situation, 
where it to some extent becomes legitimate, in the public’s view, to question the authority of the 
international conventions, which is a development seen in all European countries. According to 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, one of the consequences is that countries today go to great lengths to avoid 
their international obligations, a good example being the interdictions at high sea as described in 
chapter 5.  
 
This should naturally also be seen in relation to the legal framework described in chapter 7. As 
described through the theory of Jane McAdam it is clear that there are flaws in the regulatory 
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power of the convention, which especially has to do with the issue of sovereignty. To persuade 
enough states to ratify the convention the phrasing was kept in broad terms to not challenge state 
sovereignty, by allowing a broad level of interpretation. The thought at the time was, that a 
complementary protection system would be established instead, which would allow greater 
protection than what is provided by the Refugee Convention. This complementary system has 
however never been established, and thus the states still have a substantial regulatory freedom. 
 
As Gammeltoft-Hansen states, Western countries, such as Denmark, are not able to simply 
ignore their international obligations, since this would undoubtedly have an effect on how they 
are seen by the rest of the world. Also, it would simply send a wrong message to other regions. 
Instead, a sort of cat and mouse game is created, with the countries trying to manoeuvre between 
the different laws (GH: l. 285ff).  
 
8.4.1 The significance of the Danish opt-out 
In relation to the restrictive policies, Gammeltoft-Hansen raises an interesting point, and that is 
the significance of the Danish opt-out in the judicial area of EU regulation. The judicial opt-out 
is in his view directly related to, why the Danish asylum policy is stricter than in usually 
comparable countries. It means that unlike the other EU members, Denmark is not obliged to 
follow EU regulations within the area of refugee law. Because of a very progressive 
interpretation by the European Court of Justice, and with the introduction of European Directive 
15 C, the applicable EU law is less restrictive than the Danish law. One of the main differences 
is that according to Directive 15 C, you do not have to be individually persecuted to achieve 
protection in the EU any longer, which opens up for also granting asylum to refugees of war. 
Denmark has however chosen to continue using the criteria of individual persecution, which 
corresponds with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (GH: l. 147ff).   
 
A very important issue in relation to Denmark’s very restrictive asylum laws, compared to other 
EU countries, is that it can eventually prove to be problematic for the country’s participation in 
the Dublin Agreement. If Denmark does not live up to the same standards as the other EU 
countries, at some point it could become impossible for the other European countries to return 
asylum seekers to Denmark, due to the lack of protection. Gammeltoft-Hansen believes that this 
will eventually lead to an enormous political pressure being put on Denmark to align its asylum 
57 
 
policies with the rest of Europe, in order to continue participating in the Dublin Agreement. 
Otherwise, Denmark will not have “legitimacy to send back (...) asylum seekers to have their 
applications reviewed in other countries” (GH: l. 454ff).  
 
This view is however not shared by Peter Skaarup, who states that Denmark has an opt-out in the 
judicial area for a reason, and he will strongly encourage the government to maintain this opt-out 
and not align Denmark’s refugee regulation with that of the EU. If the problem should occur, a 
viable option in his opinion would instead be to create bilateral agreements, outside of the 
Dublin system (PS: l. 192ff).  
 
If Gammeltoft-Hansen’s predictions are correct, it will be interesting to see if Denmark is able to 
continue to withstand the pressure and maintain the strict asylum policies, or if the country will 
be forced to align its policies with the rest of Europe. In his opinion, Denmark is currently alone 
in not aligning with EU policies, as all the comparable countries are obliged to, and even 
Norway who is not a member, has long ago decided to align itself with EU minimum rules in the 
area (GH: l. 450ff).  
 
8.5 Denmark and its human rights obligations 
As described in the above, it is clear that Denmark’s asylum policies are not aligned with the 
minimum standards decided by the European Court of Justice, unlike the other European 
countries’. An important question that must follow is, weather the restrictive policies used in 
Denmark infringe on international human rights and international law. As described in chapter 2, 
one of the consequences of securitizing an issue, such as refugees or asylum seekers, can be that 
the politicians end up introducing policies, which breach general principles of law.  
 
Because of the opt-out, Denmark is not obliged to follow European law, but the country does 
have to meet the criteria established by international law. In Gammeltoft-Hansen’s expert 
opinion, Denmark does not live up to its international obligations, both in relation to the 
eligibility criteria that are used and in its treatment of refugees once they are in the country. As 
he states:  
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“you only have to look at the last years’ criticism from the human rights committees, that 
although in some cases changes have been made (...) nothing have been done, as far as I know, 
to make sure (...) that it does not happen again.” (GH: l. 401ff).  
 
The main problems in Denmark’s asylum policy in relation to breaching international law is the 
narrow definition of refugees, i.e. the fact that you have to be individually persecuted, which 
does not live up to commonly used standards. Also he brings up Denmark’s policy in relation to 
forced returns and expulsions, which he considers to violate the ECHR and the article relating to 
torture. Although it is allowed to expel people on grounds of national security reasons, 
Denmark’s interpretation of these reasons are in his view much broader than what is defined in 
the convention, and thus some of the expulsions violate international law (GH: l. 411ff). As 
explained previously in this thesis, this practice has also been heavily criticised by the UNHCR 
as well as other prominent organisations.  
 
8.6 The legitimacy of the international organisations 
An important aspect in understanding, why Denmark is able to ignore the recommendations or 
criticism presented by organisations, such as the UNHCR, is that the legitimacy and neutrality of 
the organisations are put into question. In Peter Skaarup’s view, an organisation such as the 
UNHCR:  
 
“is always interested in as many of these refugees as possible receiving help. And if that is 
possible without too much involvement by the UNHCR, but instead by the countries bringing the 
refugees to the respective countries, then that is what they would prefer.” (PS: l. 168ff). 
 
In the quote above, Skaarup calls into question the neutrality and rationales behind criticism 
raised by the UNHCR, as the organisation in his opinion has an incentive to move refugees to the 
developed countries, in an effort to reduce their own burden with refugees in the developing 
countries. 
  
A similar view is shared by the former Minister of Integration, Birthe Rønn Hornbech, who has 
previously described the UNHCR as a political organisation, with a political agenda. Also, she 
does not feel the UNHCR have the competence to interfere in Denmark’s national laws, because 
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they are not familiar with the Danish jurisprudence in the area of refugee regulation (Rønn 
Hornbech 2010). In Gammeltoft-Hansen’s view, the disregard for international organisations has 
to do with the fact that Western democratic countries, such as Denmark, cannot refute or 
disregard human rights. Instead they “refute the international organisation’s ability to critically 
interpret them [ed., the conventions].” (GH: l. 239f). In his view this does not only apply to the 
Refugee Convention and the UNHCR, but also violations of the CAT, as well as a general 
disregard for criticism raised by the human rights committees (GH: l. 241).  
 
8.7 The position of international law today 
Keeping in mind the discussions raised above, and in the previous chapters in this thesis, the 
question arises on whether international law is sufficient, and what position it holds today. It is 
clear that countries, such as Denmark, to some extent exploit the broad phrasing of the 
conventions, as well as the sometimes contradictory nature of the different international 
instruments, to further their own political interests. So what does that say about the position of 
human rights and international law today?  
 
According to Gammeltoft-Hansen, international law is still important, otherwise the countries 
would simply not make an effort to justify breaching it at times. This was also confirmed during 
the interview with Peter Skaarup who stated that, regardless of the developments, he believes 
Denmark will always be on the side of international law and try to help people, regardless of the 
criticism the country has received in the past (PS: l. 201ff).  
 
Gammeltoft-Hansen can currently see three distinct developments in term of how the western 
countries deal with their international obligations in the refugee area. The first is stating that 
human rights and international refugee law is great to have, but there must be exceptions to the 
rules. A good example of this is parts of the terror law in Denmark, which in some cases violate 
general principles of law in the name of national security, for instance the expulsions to 
countries, where torture is a commonly used interrogation method. This practice also effect 
refugees living in Denmark, as they are the ones, who risk being evicted due to their foreign 
nationalities. The practice is defended by Peter Skaarup, who instead sees it as problematic that 
Denmark cannot always expel criminal refugees from the country because of the protection 
awarded by the Refugee Convention. In his view, the convention does not take into account 
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deeply criminal refugees, “who abuse their status to commit serious criminal offences.”  
(Skaarup 2010).  
 
A second strategy is deciding that these international obligations only apply within the national 
territory, which leads to immigration control being moved outside the national territory. An 
example of this is the interdictions at high sea as described in chapter 5, where the EU enter into 
international agreements with countries as Libya and Senegal in order to move immigration 
controls on to their territory, and thus put the international obligations on them instead. The third 
approach to the international obligations is the attitude that we want human rights, but it is our 
human rights, and for this reason, we decide what falls under this category, and what does not 
(GH: l. 196ff).  
 
All three approaches co-exist and they are all present in Denmark. This also means that every 
time international law closes a gap in the legislation, countries will find another way to avoid 
being affected by it. A good example is the recent decision by the European Court of Justice, 
which means that parents that provide for a child with EU citizenship are entitled to family 
reunification, which according to Gammeltoft-Hansen will most likely result in further 
restrictions made to the rules concerning citizenship (GH: l. 290f).  
 
8.8 The protection of refugees 
As it has already been explained in chapter 7, one of the consequences of the continuous 
restrictions of refugee policies is a decrease in the level of protection, as asylum seekers are not 
necessarily awarded much protection under the general human rights regime.  
 
In addition to making it more difficult to gain protection in the traditional asylum countries, 
responsibility is now increasingly being moved to the North African states, or to the adjacent 
states of the refugees’ home countries. The problem with this is that some people cannot get 
protection in neighbouring states due to their religious or political associations, and also the 
protection is not comparable. The Refugee Convention states that acceding countries are obliged 
to award their refugees with the same rights as are given to other citizens within their territory. 
However, this means that if the general level of human rights protection in a country is low, the 
protection of the refugees will also be low, e.g. if other citizens do not enjoy freedom of religion, 
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freedom of speech, health benefits etc., neither will the refugees (GH: l. 367ff). With this in 
mind, Gammeltoft-Hansen argues that he does not see the increased focus on supplying 
protection and investing in the encompassing areas to be a viable replacement in any way. In his 
view, it is instead a path towards what he calls ‘protection light’, meaning that the level of rights 
and protection will simply decrease (GH: l. 359ff).  
 
Instead he sees it as a much more viable solution for the western states to demonstrate a positive 
example in the protection of refugees, and not merely shift the obligations onto less protective 
countries. Especially if we want other countries in the world to increasingly take responsibility 
for the refugee burden. This appeal to some extent corresponds with the point made by Peter 
Høilund in relation to the law of fear, where he warns against the slow erosion of the democratic 
and legal values, that the Danish society was founded upon. The same could happen to Denmark, 
and other EU countries, in relation to their legitimacy as human rights defender and advocates.  
 
8.9 Conclusion of chapter 
As described in the beginning of this chapter, it seems that there is a direct link between the 
restrictive refugee policies in Denmark and the perception of refugees posing a threat to the 
Danish welfare society. This seems to be largely due to the fact that Denmark has a very costly 
welfare system, which is financed via tax revenues. The problem with this system is that if too 
many people are eligible for benefits, without having contributed via public taxes, the system 
will collapse, which will threaten the whole structure and cohesiveness of society. This fear of a 
collapsing welfare state has lead to the national politicians making continuous restrictions to the 
refugee policy, and ensuring that the access to Denmark for refugees is as limited as possible.  
 
As it has been described previously, it would seem that the same dynamics that are described in 
the theoretical framework of this thesis, do in fact apply to refugee regulation as well. Based on 
the research presented in this, as well as previous chapters, the fear of the consequences refugee 
flows will have on the welfare state, and on the Danish society in general, results in the 
politicians restricting access to the country as much as possible. These restrictions sometimes 
breach international law and are often passed despite serious warning from human rights 
institutions and from the UNHCR, who are in charge of interpreting the Refugee Convention and 
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issuing guidelines within refugee regulation. Although there seem to be several reasons 
explaining this practice, it is undoubtedly also be attributed to the law of fear.  
 
These infringements are often justified by challenging the validity of the international laws and 
by simply stating that organisations, such as the UNHCR, are biased in their critique, and thus it 
should be taken with a grain of salt. The main problem with this approach is that it severely 
affects the protection of refugees. If countries such as Denmark ignore their international 
obligations in relation to refugee protection, the responsibility is instead placed on states that do 
not award the same level of human rights protection to people on their territory.  
 
Undoubtedly, it does pose a potential threat to the Danish welfare system, if too many people 
become eligible to receive welfare benefits, without having contributed to society via the taxes. 
Especially with the aging population, it is crucial for Denmark to have immigration that 
contributes to society instead of adding to the financial burden. With this in mind, it seems sound 
to have some degree of limitations and requirements placed on people seeking a residence permit 
in the country. However, in this respect it must be argued, that it is important to make a clear 
distinction between migrants and refugees, as the latter do not come of free will but out of need, 
as their life and wellbeing is threatened in their home country. This makes it especially 
problematic, when it is made almost impossible to be granted asylum, as this forces the refugees 
to apply for protection in countries, that do not have the same human rights standards, creating a 
form of ‘protection light’ instead.  
 
Despite restrictions being necessary in some cases, Denmark and other western countries must 
respect the applicable international laws, even if they seem outdated. As it is also emphasised by 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, this is especially important if the EU countries wishes to maintain their 
position as human rights advocates in relation to less developed countries, and if they want these 
countries to share the refugee burden.   
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9. Conclusion 
Based on the research of this thesis, Denmark has undergone a significant transformation in its 
attitude towards refugee regulation. Its refugee policies have developed from being the most 
liberal and humanitarian in Europe to being the most restrictive, and today the country is often 
criticised by respected international organisations, e.g. ECRE, UNHCR and Amnesty 
International. The criticism is especially directed towards Denmark’s family reunification rules, 
the practice of expelling both rejected asylum seekers and refugees to countries that are known to 
use torture, the indefinite stays at both refugee and detention centres as well as the reduced 
welfare benefits, called start help, which are primarily given to refugees and immigrants.    
 
Based on the theory used in this thesis, there seem to be a strong link between the continuous 
restrictions of the Danish refugee policy and the perception of refugees posing a threat to the 
viability of the Danish welfare society. This is especially attributed to the fact that Denmark is a 
small, homogeneous country that offers a high level of social benefits to its inhabitants, 
including new comers. It thus puts pressure on the state if too many new comers, such as 
refugees, become eligible for benefits without also having contributed through taxes. Also, it 
should be seen in relation to a general fear of the consequences brought on by globalisation in 
the sense that other cultures and nationalities could disrupt the order and harmony in the Danish 
society, and challenge the national values and identity. 
 
These factors all contribute to a political, and to some extent also public, belief in the necessity 
of restricting access to the country for the so-called weaker immigrants, such as refugees, and on 
their access to welfare benefits. However, the restrictions in Denmark have now become so 
extensive, that they at times breach international law. As explained in the theoretical framework 
of this thesis, this should be seen as a consequence of the securitisation of refugees, which has 
given the politicians large regulatory freedom, in protecting the state from the threat of refugees. 
Currently, the international laws seem to be breached both in terms of the eligibility criteria set 
to achieve refugee status in Denmark, and by the expulsion of refugees to countries, that are 
known to use torture. This, in combination with the measures used by the EU to prevent refugees 
from setting foot in any EU country, has severely reduced the general protection of refugees. 
This is mainly because, both the rejected asylum seekers, and the ones that are intercepted at 
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high sea before reaching Europe, all risk being returned to countries that have significantly lower 
human rights standards, and thus a lower level of protection, than the European countries.  
 
The reason why it is possible for Denmark, and other countries, to circumvent their international 
obligations at times is the fact that the Refugee Convention is phrased very broadly to allow a 
large degree of interpretational freedom to the nation states, to avoid challenging their 
sovereignty. In Denmark, this has however resulted in a very narrow interpretation of the 
convention, and a strong focus on protecting the sovereign right of deciding, who is allowed to 
access the national territory.  
 
To some extent, this raises the question, if it threatens the position of international law and 
human rights, if states, such as Denmark, go out of their way to avoid their international 
obligations. Especially when it concerns a group of people that have been forced to leave their 
home countries due to persecution or civil war, and who must instead rely on the protection of 
countries as Denmark, that claim to be strong advocates of democracy and legal certainty. It 
should be kept in mind, that if a country as Denmark continue to ignore its international 
obligations, it will likely also become increasingly difficult to convince less developed countries 
of the importance of respecting international obligations and human rights.  
 
Based on the findings above, the recommendation of this research is that Denmark needs to 
ensure that any restrictions to its refugee policies are within the boundaries of international law. 
Also, the country should refer to the generally accepted principles of the Refugee Convention, 
i.e. it is not necessary to be individually persecuted and expulsions are only possible in serious 
matters of national security. This is the only way to ensure proper protection of involuntary 
migrants, both in Denmark and elsewhere. 
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10. Topics for future research 
Due to the limited time and page numbers that have been at my disposal during this thesis 
process, it has unfortunately been necessary to disregard certain topics and discussions that could 
have been interesting to include in the research. For this reason, the following chapter will 
briefly discuss possible topics for future research. 
 
Instead of looking at refugees in general it could also have been interesting to be more specific 
and focus on a certain group, such as the many unaccompanied minors that come to Denmark 
every year. The reason why this could be an interesting group to focus on is that they have more 
rights than general refugees, as they, in addition to the Refugee Convention, are also protected 
by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). This group is possibly the most vulnerable 
amongst all refugee groups, and for this reason it could be interesting to see how Denmark 
tackles its obligations, and how the minors are treated compared to other refugee groups. This 
could especially be researched in the light of a new law passed in Denmark in 2010, which 
stipulates that unaccompanied minors, that are refused a residence permit, should be sent back to 
refugee camps in adjacent countries to their own. In addition to this, it was also decided that 
residence permits given to unaccompanied minors should only be temporary and expire at the 
age of 18 to limit the number of children, who become victims of human trafficking due to the 
prospect of a permanent residence permit. This new law has been criticised by organisations as 
Save the Children, the Danish Refugee Council and Danish Red Cross, who believe the new 
provisions are in direct violation of the CRC, as it is not in the best interest of the child 
(Davidsen-Nielsen &.Christiansen 2010). It would thus be interesting to carry out in depth 
research on that specific topic, and discuss whether Denmark is breaching the CRC, what 
consequences this new law could have for unaccompanied minors as well as the law’s effects on 
child trafficking. 
 
Another issue which could have been interesting to focus more on is the selection criteria set for 
selecting the 500 quota refugees that Denmark accepts every year. As stated in chapter 4, most of 
the refugees selected on the quota trips are now selected on the basis of their integration 
potential, instead of purely for humanitarian reasons, which has inter alia led to a significant 
decrease in the number of selected quota refugees of Muslim faith. A relevant discussion in 
relation to this practice could be if it contradicts the intentions of the quota system, as well as 
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how it relates to the general understanding of being a refugee. Also, it would be relevant to 
research what integration potential means in practical terms and if this selection method has the 
intended effects after the resettlement in Denmark.  
 
Finally a last discussion, which could be interesting to include, had I had more time at my 
disposal, is what the consequences would be, should Denmark have a change of government 
after the elections later this year. It is clear that the Danish People’s Party has had a profound 
effect on both immigration and refugee policies since the election in 2001 due to the 
constellation of the Danish Parliament. It could for this reason be relevant to consider, how a 
change of government would impact the Danish Refugee Policy, as well as the state’s 
relationship with international as well as EU law.  
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Appendix 1: Transcription of interview with Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 1 
I = Interviewer 2 
T = Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 3 
 4 
I: Det ku være spændende hvis du ku starte med en meget kort introduktion til, hvordan du 5 
oplever udviklingen i asylpolitikken i Danmark. 6 
 7 
T: Altså sådan helt overordnet så kan man jo sige, den er gået lidt fra at ha’ været et modelland 8 
blandt dem der troede på en mere liberal udlændinge eller flygtningepolitik faktisk mere 9 
specifikt, det galt så også familiesammenføring, men det var helt specifikt altså absolut de ting 10 
man kodificerede dermed, dem man havde man simpelthen. Altså sådan noget som 11 
arbejdsindvandring og efter indvandring stoppet i 73, der havde du ikke rigtig politikker skarpt 12 
formuleret på det her område. Og der ser situationen helt anderledes ud i dag i forhold til lovlig 13 
indvandring og især arbejdsindvandring. Men, man er lidt gået fra en situation hvor vi tit blev 14 
fremhævet som sådan lidt rollemodellandet af FN’s flygtningehøjkommissariat til at være.. gå så 15 
meget i den modsatte grøft, at selvfølgelig har vi stadig mere retssikkerhed end der er i et land 16 
som Grækenland, men på papiret har vi en af de strammeste asyllovgivninger i Europa, og det 17 
har vi især kva af, at vi ikke er omfattet af EU’s fælles regler på asylområdet og selvfølgelig 18 
fordi, at vi altså har gennemført rigtig mange stramninger i udlændingeloven siden 83. Det er 19 
sådan den virkelig lange bue, det er selvfølgelig interessant og bemærkelsesværdigt især fordi, at 20 
selvom der har været tilsvarende tendenser i mange andre lande og sådan nogle ting, så har det 21 
været alt andet lige mere radikalt i Danmark. Altså man er virkelig gået fra det ene til det andet 22 
yderpunkt. Det er interessant fordi nogle af de lande vi normalt sammenligner os med, 23 
eksempelvis Norge og Sverige selvom de også har gennemført stramninger, simpelthen ikke har 24 
gennemgået den samme bane. Når så de ting er sagt, at det er dem som gør Danmark specielt så 25 
at sige, så skal man selvfølgelig også holde sig for øje at det der overordnet er sket, de 26 
udviklinger der har været, er ikke unikke for Danmark. Altså der er jo nærmest ikke noget land i 27 
Europa som ikke har de her højrefløjspartier, eller meget stram udlændingeretorik i den politiske 28 
debat, altså det ser du nærmest i alle lande. Altså den seneste sag her i forhold til Italien og 29 
Frankrig i forhold til Schengen, som kom i går med forslaget om at man skal ændre Schengen-30 
loven. Er lige præcis et udtryk for det, det vil efter min mening ikke betyde man kommer til at 31 
ændre Schengen reglerne.. 32 
I: Hvad går det forslag helt præcis ud på egentlig? 33 
T: Altså der har jo været den her sag med de Nordafrikanske flygtninge der kom ind og Italien 34 
der gerne ville sende dem videre for at sende et signal om, at resten af Europa skulle til at tage et 35 
ansvar, altså Dublin-problemet, i forhold til manglende byrdefordeling. Frankrig har stået imod 36 
og nu er de sådan ligesom kommet overens med en meget stor metaaftale, som betyder, at Italien 37 
formentlig får en SB bankdirektør og Frankrig får nogle andre ting, sådan en kæmpe ting sikkert 38 
udløst af denne her indvandringsdebat. Som bl.a. betød at de ville lave et ændringsforslag til 39 
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Schengen som skal betyde, at man kan lukke af i tilfælde af masseindvandring. Jeg tror ikke 40 
forslaget har gang på jorden, hvis jeg var et Østeuropæisk eller Sydeuropæisk land, så ville jeg 41 
stritte imod med næb og klør, men det er et udmærket eksempel på, at her har du 2 lande med 2 42 
ledere som på hver sin vis er kommet til på en dagsorden, som handler om at være stram, når det 43 
kommer til udlændingepolitikken, så det er ikke tilfældigt at det er Berlusconi og Sarkozy. Det 44 
viser meget godt denne her måde, hvordan på trods af, at vi i stigende grad må konstatere jamen 45 
altså problemet er tværnationalt, regionalt, internationalt, og at vi har i stigende grad fælles regler 46 
og koordineringsmekanismer og der kommer et nyt EU asylstøttekontor, vi har fælles asylregler, 47 
selvom Danmark står udenfor de fleste af dem, vi har fri bevægelighed på tværs af grænser og alt 48 
muligt andet, så er det stadig et meget nationalt orienteret problem det her med indvandring, 49 
fordi indvandring, herunder asyl og flygtninge, er måske den mest håndgribelige konsekvens af 50 
globalisering. Så det bliver kort sagt og lidt forenklet, fanget op i denne her generelle frygt som 51 
eksisterer for forandring, at det at forandring kan medføre noget negativt for nogle grupper, og 52 
det gælder især i klassiske velfærdsøkonomier som ikke er tunet til at tage imod mange 53 
mennesker eller grundlæggende ændrede arbejdsstrukturer, når arbejdspladser bliver outsourcet, 54 
alle de her ting som er fanget ind under de her dynamikker.  Så det er ikke unikt for Danmark 55 
men Danmark har valgt en anden kurs overordnet set, det gælder selvfølgelig først og fremmest i 56 
forhold til det her med det Europæiske, fordi de fleste lande har stået i det her dilemma, eller 57 
trilemma kan man vel sige mellem på den ene side udlændingepolitik, især asyl flygtninge er 58 
noget som meget grundlæggende påvirker nationalitet og suverænitetsopfattelser, altså det vil 59 
sige det at bestemme hvem der kommer ind og hvem der må blive her, især hvis man ikke har 60 
inviteret dem, fordi man har et arbejdsmarkedsbehov, er simpelthen sådan en kerne suveræn 61 
funktion. Har altid været det, det er ikke noget nyt. Asylsystemet kan siges at være sådan 62 
undtagelsen til enhver stats suveræne ret til at bestemme og afvise enhver udlænding. Men derfor 63 
er det også i den forstand ret skrøbeligt, og vil altid linke til debat, og det er heller ikke nyt, at 64 
der er denne her debat. Det er måske blevet politiseret på en anden måde og har en større politisk 65 
bevågenhed end det har haft før, men der har hele tiden stået debat om det, det har altid været et 66 
klart dilemma. Det var det også i 83, da man lavede den oprindelige udlændingelov. Det er den 67 
ene af de her 3, den anden er sådan et dilemma mellem national selvkontrol, det ligner 68 
selvfølgelig den foregående, og internationalt samarbejde. Sorry, den første handler måske mere 69 
om det her med suverænitetskontrol versus liberale ideer, for man vil jo gerne være en retsstat og 70 
give menneskerettigheder og alt muligt andet. Det andet, lidt relateret men alt andet lige distinkt, 71 
handler om det her med, er det her noget du skal styre selv, altså have national selvkontrol, og 72 
deraf den fleksibilitet der følger til at kunne ændre kurs, hvis man pludselig står med en helt 73 
anden vælgerskare som vil noget andet eller er det noget man skal vælge at samarbejde om mere 74 
internationalt og overgive kompetencer på. Det er jo så lige præcis det her med, at fordi det er et 75 
problem, altså hvis et land strammer deres flygtningepolitik, påvirker det alle nabolandene. Når 76 
du har fri bevægelighed, jamen så er der nogle ret oplagte konsekvenser i forhold til både 77 
indvandring og asylansøgere. Så det gir mening at harmonisere de her ting, det gir mening at 78 
samarbejde. Der er også nogen som mener det giver mere mening at samarbejde endnu mere, så 79 
der kommer en mere reel byrdefordeling, når du nu har en fælles grænsekontrol og et Dublin 80 
system, som betyder at alle dem der kommer nu, skal som udgangspunkt søge asyl i det første 81 
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land de ankommer i. Så påvirker det jo også igen yderlandene især meget hårdt. Der har, selvom 82 
alle landene har denne her med sådan mmm… det handler om suverænitet og selvkontrol og alle 83 
de her ting, så har de fleste andre lande alligevel valgt en anden overordnet kurs og sige, jamen 84 
det til trods, vil vi have internationalt samarbejde. Og der står Danmark ret alene, det jo vores 85 
forbehold jeg snakker om nu, vores retsforbehold. At man har valgt at sige, at det vil vi stå 86 
udenfor, og at man fortsat vælger at sige det, for selv hvis vi får omdannet forbeholdet er der 87 
meget der ser ud til, den nuværende politiske situation og sådan noget, at vi vil prøve at lave en 88 
eller anden form for deal med, at vi ikke går med på asylpolitikken. 89 
I: Altså så det vil sige, at når vi skal stemme om at fjerne retsforbeholdet, så bliver det eksklusiv 90 
asyl? 91 
T: Vi stemmer formentlig ikke om at fjerne retsforbeholdet, det bliver formentlig omdannet til en 92 
tilvalgsordning i stedet, altså en opt-in ligesom den engelske. Og de forventer de fleste vil blive 93 
fulgt op af et eller andet pseudo-national kompromis omkring, hvad for nogle ting, man så vil gå 94 
med på, og hvad for nogle man ik behøver. Så man vil gå med på et eller andet politisamarbejde 95 
for eksempel, men formegentlig ik på udlændinge.  96 
I: Det er meget interessant at du siger det med, at det gir mening det med at harmonisere inden 97 
for EU i forhold til det med asyl- og flygtningepolitikken. Men en ting er, at Danmark står 98 
udenfor med retsforbeholdet, men på den anden side virker det også til, at de står udenfor i 99 
forhold til.. altså hver gang der kommer en afgørelse fra EU retten, så er det meget med at EU 100 
skal ikke bestemme vores politik, for eksempel med Metock-dommen. 101 
T: Det er jo formelt set ikke en del af retspolitikken, men det er af samme grund. Jeg vil sige, der 102 
handler det ikke kun bare om internationalt samarbejde, men også lidt om internationale 103 
institutioner.  104 
I: Der virker det netop lidt som om, at Danmark netop ikke vil have at EU blander sig. 105 
T: Men der står vi heller ikke alene altså, der er andre. Og EU domstolens opgave er sgu lidt at 106 
gøre medlemslandene sure. Grunden til, at man lavede en meget stærk EU domstol, som skulle 107 
gå ind og gøre de her ting, det var fordi man godt vidste, at de regler man ville lave på EU plan, 108 
at de ikke ville blive detaljerede nok. At der ville komme konflikt over, hvordan de skulle 109 
fortolkes i forskellige retstraditioner og alt muligt andet, og at man formentlig ville ha, at 110 
forskellige lande gik fra bordet med ret forskellige opfattelser af, hvad der var blevet vedtaget. 111 
Så at mange kompromiser, så at sige skød man til hjørne ved at sige, nå men den vi laver en lidt 112 
kryptisk formulering og så må det sgu være EU domstolen der tager den siden hen, når vi kan se 113 
hvad det konkrete problem bliver på det her område. Man kan ikke sådan helt forudsige alting, 114 
derfor er der sgu ik noget nyt i, at EU domstolen går ind og skal gøre det her. Men i den kontekst 115 
der handler om udlændinge, der kan man godt se at okay EU domstolen er gået relativt langt 116 
altså, men det har også været deres mandat altså. EU domstolen har lidt fået et mandat der 117 
hedder, jamen når vi fortolker og der er usikkerhed, og der er 2 mulige udfald, så er vi for 118 
integration.  Altså så EU domstolen har fået et mandat der hedder, if in doubt mere integration. 119 
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Derfor kan man også måske se de her udfald på denne her måde, og jo det har helt sikkert skabt 120 
reaktioner ikke bare i Danmark men også i andre lande. Det handler måske ikke så meget om 121 
udlændingepolitik, selvom det er en eksponent for det, som det handler om en grundlæggende 122 
modvilje mod, at regler kommer andre steder fra end fra det danske Folketing. Og den rammer jo 123 
også lidt EU regler generelt ik. 124 
I: Så det er tilbage til suverænitetsspørgsmålet? 125 
T: Ja, det tror jeg. Det er min umiddelbare analyse. Jeg kan se det også er sådan rundt regnet 126 
indenfor menneskerettighedsområdet, at man er sådan lidt imod når forskellige FN kommitteer 127 
etc. udtaler sig i konkrete sager og sådan nogle ting, uh ha det er jo ikke bindene for Danmark, vi 128 
vil selv beslutte og sådan nogle ting.  129 
I: I forlængelse af dette vil jeg gerne vide, hvordan der er muligt for Danmark at ignorere 130 
UNHCR’s anbefalinger og EU's anbefalinger på asylområdet og ligesom bare sige, jamen det er 131 
vi uenige i. 132 
 T: Altså man kan sige, at retligt set er der ikke nogen tvivl om, at Danmark har ret til at stå uden 133 
for EU’s fælles regler på asylområdet. Politisk set er det noget mere besværligt. For det første 134 
fordi, at lige de regler der er der nu, blev vedtaget eksplicit som værende minimumsgarantier jo. 135 
Altså de minimumsregler der skulle til for at man kunne opretholde et Dublin system og for at 136 
man ligesom kunne leve op til de Europæiske menneskeretlige traditioner. Så det er sådan 137 
konventionerne plus god fortolkningsstil af samme, men heller ikke mere. Altså Danmark brugte 138 
lang tid på at sige, at vores udlændinge og asylpolitik var i fuld overensstemmelse med EU’s 139 
asylregler. Dels fordi, jamen det så altså godt ud og dels for at sige, jamen at det gør det jo alt 140 
andet lige politisk meget nemmere at være medlem af Dublin. Og selvom vi står uden for de 141 
fælles asylregler, så er vi altså med og har fået en undtagelse fra forbeholdet for at kunne være 142 
med i Dublin. Det kan samtidig sætte Danmark i en lidt svær position. Nu er det begyndt at blive 143 
ret tydeligt, at nej vi er mere restriktive på visse punkter, og det er netop også kommet til efter, at 144 
EU’s regler er blevet fortolket og klarlagt af EU domstolen, at Danmark på visse punkter er mere 145 
restriktiv. 146 
I: Hvad er de væsentligste punkter, hvor vi er mere restriktive? 147 
T: Det er især denne her med artikel 15c, hvor der er et beskyttelseskriterium fra 148 
kvalifikationsdirektivet for personer der flygter fra omfattende krig og vold og sådan nogle ting, 149 
hvor Danmark ikke i samme omfang giver til de her ting. Vi følger i højere grad den europæiske 150 
menneskerettighedsdomstols praksis. Men det er simpelthen ikke ligeså bredt, og det er 151 
formentlig også i vores vurdering af asylgrundlag, altså det at vi kræver, at folk er individuelt 152 
forfulgte. Så der må man sige, at nej der ligger Danmark nok noget under. Der er også nogle 153 
procesdurale krav altså, hvor vores struktur ser også anderledes ud. EU reglerne kræver jo som 154 
udgangspunkt at man skal have appelmulighed til en domstol, og det kan man ikke rigtig sige at 155 
Flygtningenævnet er længere. Da man oprettede det sagde man jo, at Flygtningenævnet skulle 156 
være domstolslignende, men det er bare lidt nemmere med 7 medlemmer og en bred 157 
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sammensætning end med 3, hvor den ene af de tre er fra samme instans som afslog sagen i første 158 
omgang. Så det er ligesom den anden. Det er jo så EU delen, FN, altså UNHCR er jo den 159 
organisation som der er sat og har fået mandat til at monitorere implementeringen af 160 
flygtningekonventionen.  Men det er ikke en domstol, men man kan sige at deres fortolkning, må 161 
man antage hvis man er en ordentlig jurist, som ønsker at fortolke i god tro i forhold til 162 
konventionerne, bør tillægges en dog meget stor vægt, eftersom de har den absolutte ekspertise 163 
på det her område og overblik på tværs af lande. Så når de kommer med meget klare 164 
anbefalinger, og ikke bare siger det vil være alle tiders hvis gjorde sådan her, men sagde det I gør 165 
er oplagt ikke foreneligt med flygtningekonventionen. Så bør man tage det ganske alvorligt, det 166 
står der sådan en vis strid om. Men der skal man også tage højde for, eller en af forklaringerne 167 
for hvorfor Danmark ikke gør det ud over det rent politiske, skal også ses lidt i lyset af den 168 
danske retstradition. Hvor vi i Danmark, andre lande har det til dels, men få lande i helt samme 169 
omfang og nogle lande slet ikke, for der er forskellige retstraditioner, har en relativ dualistisk 170 
retstradition. Det vil sige, at vi skelner ret skarpt imellem, hvad er international ret og 171 
internationale forpligtelser, altså Folkeretten, herunder menneske- og flygtningeretten, og hvad 172 
er national ret. Og den Europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention er for eksempel direkte 173 
inkorporeret i dansk lov ved lov. Det gælder ikke flygtningekonventionen. Og derfor er der 174 
mange danske jurister som er tilbøjelige til at sige, jamen så har den ikke samme retsstatus i 175 
dansk ret, og den har altså ikke samme fortolkningsgyldighed, du kan ikke bare fortolke den ind. 176 
Og selv hvis du gjorde, så er der altså stadig det at sige til det, at det er en international lov, skal 177 
man så se på det som om det var dansk ret, og er det så danske dommere der skal fortolke på det 178 
og ikke en international organisation. Så der er nogle spændinger der. Spændinger som 179 
harmonerer rigtig dårligt med det at være et globalt land, som lever i en tidsalder, hvor der er 180 
flere internationale retsaftaler end nogensinde før. Det er jo eksploderet ikke bare på det her 181 
område, men handelsaftaler og regionale samarbejdsaftaler og alle mulige former. Det er lidt, jeg 182 
vil mene personligt, at det er en lidt bagstræberisk tilgang. Altså du kan simpelthen ikke 183 
opretholde den, det er lidt en illusion at tro at det er et helt andet retsfelt internationalt end det er 184 
nationalt. Der kan selvfølgelig gælde forskellige regler, og der er nogle særlige 185 
fortolkningsregler der gælder  i forhold til Folkeretten, som skal overholdes der, som er 186 
anderledes end de nationale traditioner og andre ting man lægger vægt på. Men når Danmark 187 
vælger at indgå og underskrive, ratificere, en bindende international konvention, 188 
Flygtningekonventionen såvel som en EU traktat, jamen så har det nogle retsvirkninger. EU 189 
retten er sådan en anden størrelse, det har den været fra starten, altså hvis det her skal virke så 190 
skal det simpelthen have en anden status end almindelige konventioner. Men der er også en del 191 
af forklaringen tror jeg på at man frasiger sig…. Den sidste del det er lidt, at vi lever i en 192 
tidsalder hvor netop når det her udlændingespørgsmål bliver politiseret, så vil man på den ene 193 
side meget nødigt sige jamen vi vil slet ikke overholde flygtningekonventionen, vi vil slet ikke 194 
leve op til internationale principper omkring asyl og sådan nogle ting. Det er jo alt andet lige 195 
dårlig for en retsstat som Danmark, og ser rigtig dårligt ud, så derfor prøver man at gøre andre 196 
ting. Og man kan lidt se 3 strategier synes jeg. Den første er at sige, at menneskerettigheder og 197 
flygtningerettigheder er alle tiders, men der må være undtagelser. Mod det her kan f.eks. tale 198 
situationer, hvor det handler om terror eller national sikkerhed eller forskellige andre ting. Og det 199 
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har vi jo også set i Danmark, altså hvordan terrorlovgivningen har lavet nogle udhulinger, hvor 200 
man udviser nogle folk som måske stadig har ret til beskyttelse under flygtningekonventionen. 201 
Og siger menneskerettigheder er meget godt, men der må være noget der trumfer 202 
menneskerettighederne, national sikkerhed. Den holder ikke i forhold til fortolkningen af de her 203 
konventioner. Der er en del menneskerettighedskonventioner, herunder flygtningekonventionen, 204 
der indeholder bestemte undtagelsesmuligheder når der er tale om trusler mod national sikkerhed 205 
eller alvorlige trusler mod den offentlige orden, fuldstændigt som der står i Schengen 206 
konventionen, så kan du godt indføre midlertidig grænsekontrol. Men kriterierne for hvornår det 207 
er det er nået er altså væsentlig højere end dem man i praksis anvender. Så det har lidt været en 208 
tendens, det er også noget af det USA har gjort i visse tilfælde og sådan noget, the war on terror 209 
or sådan nogle ting. Den anden tendens er, at man ligesom siger, nå ja men menneskerettigheder 210 
det er jo fint og flygtningerettigheder det er alle tiders, og det er jo noget som så må gælde på 211 
dansk territorium. Det kan jo ikke gælde over hele verden. Og så bruger man lidt globaliseringen 212 
til at rykke f.eks. grænsekontrol væk fra territoriet. Så hvor der ikke er noget tvivl om, at du har 213 
ret til at søge asyl når du lander i lufthavnen i Kastrup, eller hvis du møder op på politistationen 214 
ved Hovedbanegården, så siger man jamen der står jo ikke noget specifikt om, hvorvidt 215 
konventionen gælder på høj sø eller når vi f.eks. laver en aftale med Libyen elle Senegal om at 216 
lave grænsekontrol inde i deres territoriale farvand. Og det er den tendens man har set, som jeg 217 
også har beskrevet i en del arbejder, om at outsource eller off shore eller ekstraterritorialisere sin 218 
myndighedsudøvelse. Det her med grænsekontrollen er et eksempel på det, et fuldstændigt 219 
parallelt eksempel er selvfølgelig USA’s politik omkring fangedetention på Guantanamo. Altså 220 
igen er argumentet, jamen den amerikanske forfatning gælder ikke her, det har den amerikanske 221 
højesteret så endeligt, efter en del domme, afvist. Men det var udgangspunktet. 222 
I: Hvilken plads ser du så overhovedet at Folkeretten har og kommer til at have i Fremtiden?  223 
T: Den del er lige, lad mig lige, det var 2 ik. Så den første det er den her med undtagelser, terror 224 
trumfer menneskerettigheder. Den anden er, at man siger jamen menneskerettigheder inden for 225 
landets grænser men ikke uden for ik, og der ser du virkelig en vækst i sager nu, et kæmpe antal 226 
sager som handler om alt fra engelske soldater i Irak of Afghanistan til franske skibe, som samler 227 
pirater op og sådan nogle ting. Alle mulige forskellige steder i verden ik. I gamle dage var der jo 228 
en grundlæggende ide om, at stater kun udøvede suveræn magt inden for deres territorium. Den 229 
holder ikke i en globaliseret sammenhæng. I virkeligheden er det netop Folkeretten, det vil sige 230 
alle de her internationale aftaler, altså når du laver en aftale med Libyen, så er det også en 231 
folkeretlig aftale. Når du laver en pagt eller en konvention eller et eller andet for netop at have 232 
denne her samarbejdsplan. Den sidste og endelige, det er den der handler om institutionerne, der 233 
siger at, menneskerettigheder er fint nok, men det er vores menneskerettigheder, så vi vil have 234 
lov til at fortolke dem som vi vil og have lov at grundlæggende selv bestemme, hvornår noget er 235 
menneskerettigheder og ej, og det er jo det vi netop lige har talt om. At man er blevet meget 236 
mere kritisk i en række lande, Danmark er et godt eksempel, England meget tilsvarende i forhold 237 
til den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol, Australien under den gamle Howard regering, 238 
havde fuldstændigt det samme, man afviser ikke menneskerettighederne som sådan, det er svært 239 
at gøre i et liberalt demokrati. Men man afviser de internationale organisationers kompetence til 240 
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kritisk at fortolke dem. Og det er blevet rigtig tydeligt i Danmark, altså hvis man bare kigger på 241 
sidste år, så og det var ikke bare UNHCR’s kritik, det så også kritik fra 3 242 
menneskerettighedskommitteer, menneskerettighedsrådet, torturkonventionen, 243 
børnerettighedskonventionen, som man da de kom med deres kritik, nærmest blankt afviste. I en 244 
del af tilfældene netop i udlændingesager.  Så altså man kan lidt se 3 spor på de her ting, 3 245 
forskellige, som alle sammen kan sameksistere. Men som alle sammen sjovt nok er forsøg på at 246 
prøve at sige, jamen vi tør ikke at tage denne her direkte konfrontation, vi vil ikke af med 247 
menneskerettighederne. Men vi vil gerne prøve at genvinde noget af den suverænitet eller evne 248 
til at udøve magt som man måske har båndlagt ved at underskrive de her konventioner. Og så 249 
spørger du så, jamen hvad betyder det her så for Folkeretten generelt. 250 
I: Og også i fremtiden tænker jeg. 251 
T: Ja. Helt overordnet set så tror jeg ikke, det er jo ikke noget kritik af Folkeretten. Tvært imod, 252 
altså rigtig meget af det her fungerer kun pga. Folkeretten, og fordi Folkeretten har udvidet sig 253 
og fordi vi lever i en tid, hvor der er flere internationale regler end nogensinde. En sidste strategi 254 
i forhold til det her udlændingeting det har jo også været at sige, nå men hvis det ikke er så 255 
heldigt i forhold til denne her konvention så kan man sikkert finde nogle andre regler, hvor det 256 
passer. Så man retfærdiggører, at man muligvis overtræder den Europæiske 257 
menneskerettighedskonvention ved at sige, jamen det skal vi jo for det står der i Dublin-aftalen, 258 
når vi sender asylansøgere tilbage til Grækenland ik. Altså, det var Birthe Rønn Hornbechs 259 
argument. Den holder simpelthen ikke juridisk, men man kan sige, at eksplosionen af aftaler kan 260 
også skabe en vis regelforvirring og mulighed for lidt strategisk at udnytte en regel forvirring. Nå 261 
det så er sagt, jamen så er det helt klart at det mange jurister havde forventet egentligt, og det den 262 
klassiske teori lidt forudser det er, at i denne her udvidelse af og forstærket internationalt 263 
samarbejde bundet i juridiske former af forskellig art, der havde mange regnet med, at vi ville se 264 
en udvikling mod, at vi blev mere og mere ehmm, at statens rå magt blev mere og mere tæmmet. 265 
Altså fordi at man indgik i mere og mere samarbejde. Det er den klassiske liberale teori, altså 266 
kosmopolitisk teori. Der er min analyse i virkeligheden en lidt anden. Det skrive jeg om i min 267 
bog, at der er det jo netop interessant at se, at det der sker, altså præmisset er rigtigt, der er 268 
kommet mange flere regler, men resultatet er simpelthen ikke det de har forudset. Fordi tvært 269 
imod, så i det her øde retlige rum, netop fordi det er Folkeret, fordi det altid vil være i et vist 270 
omfang uperfekt, altså det er ikke fuldstændig cut clear fortolkning. Det er jura aldrig, men det 271 
gælder måske især internationale konventioner, at der ikke er de samme effektive 272 
fortolkningsinstanser, altså domstolsprøvelsesmyndigheder og sådan noget, og der ikke er de 273 
samme enforcementmekanismer. Det vil sige, at selvom du måske får kritik fra en international 274 
menneskerettighedskommitte, så er der jo ikke den samme, okay så skal det her ændres nu. 275 
Menneskerettighedskommitteen fungerer lidt ligesom ombudsmanden. 276 
I: Det er sådan lidt naming and shaming. 277 
T: Ja, lige præcis. At de har kun den magt, der ligger i, at folk rent faktisk tror på, at det er vigtigt 278 
at gøre som de siger. Der er ikke noget officiel retshåndhævelsesmyndighed. Og det betyder, 279 
80 
 
efter min mening, at du kan se en tendens til, at stater i stigende grad er sådan instrumentalistiske 280 
i deres fortolkning af internationale regler. Det er ikke det samme som, at man bare afviser 281 
reglerne. Og dette er lidt den lette kritik. Indtil videre har debatten meget stået imellem dem her 282 
som sagde, hey flere regler og mere kosmopolisme, så staten bliver domesticeret og tæmmet i det 283 
her internationale spil. Og så dem som sagde, prøv at høre, det kan godt være vi har alle de her 284 
regler, men når det kommer ned til det, rå politik, så vil vi skide på dem. Sådan klassisk 285 
suverænitetsteori. Der ser jeg lidt sådan en mellemting, fordi jeg tror at reglerne betyder rigtig 286 
meget. Ellers ville du heller ikke bruge mange penge på at lave aftaler med Libyen og Senegal 287 
og alt muligt andet, du ville ikke lave alle de her krumspring. Hvis du bare ku afvise de her 288 
internationale konventioner som ubetydelige, jamen hvorfor sku du så overhovedet gi dig ud i 289 
alle de her fiksfakserier og tale om, at terror trumfer det ene og alt muligt andet. Men det man 290 
helt sikkert gør er igennem de her forskellige strategier at sige, nå men vi prøver at genvinde den 291 
politiske handlefrihed gennem mere kreativ fortolkning. Altså man kan sammenligne det lidt 292 
med Glistrups skattepolitik. Det er lidt et billede på hvad vi ser med de her internationale regler, 293 
altså at man går meget mere instrumentalistisk til værks. Plus oveni at der er selvfølgelig en del 294 
af det, og noget af det, som hvis man følger og analyserer på debatter og alt muligt andet, hvor 295 
man simpelthen siger ét men gør noget andet. Så når Dansk Folkeparti i dag siger vi skal opstille 296 
grænsebomme igen, så er det lidt en and ik. 297 
I: Men tror du så, at man bliver mere kreativ til at undgå Folkeretten i fremtiden eller tror du 298 
Folkeretten på et tidspunkt bliver mere skarp. 299 
T: Altså, det er jo som et katten og musen spil, fordi så kommer der jo altså nogen gange, eller 300 
hele tiden, domme fra den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol, som betyder man må rette 301 
ind. EU domstolen har jo også, er jo væsentlig mere effektiv som institution, også ligesom i 302 
forhold til at guide og sige hey, så bliver det sådan og sådan. Men det kommer formentlig ikke til 303 
at betyde, at spillet stopper. Det betyder jo netop, at man så udvikler andre politikker eller prøver 304 
at udnytte andre huller. Det, at der nu er kommet en ny dom omkring børn og 305 
familiesammenføringsregler, det betyder jo så at mange lande vil stramme reglerne for 306 
overhovedet at få statsborgerskab. Altså så kan man skrue på nogle andre ting. Så på den måde 307 
så spille næppe stopper. Om man bliver bedre til det, det ved jeg ikke. Jo men, det kan man 308 
måske godt sige ik, fordi at spillet hele tiden udvikler sig.  309 
I:Nu siger du selv, at mange af de domme der er ved den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol 310 
er på flygtningeområdet, eller udlændinge og flygtningeområdet, men hvorfor lige det område? 311 
T: Det er ikke kun den jo, det er også menneskerettighedskommitteerne. Altså det er jo bare fordi 312 
det har fyldt, der er jo masser af andre domme også, men de domme som har fået sådan meget 313 
umiddelbar betydning for Danmark her de sidste par år. Men altså jeg tror ikke det er sådan 314 
unaturligt, det er det område hvor folk politisk er bekymret, det er der hvor man strammer på 315 
reglerne. Når man begynder at stramme på reglerne, og den attitude som har været i Danmark, 316 
såvel som i mange andre lande, har jo været at vi prøver at gå lige til grænsen for hvad vi må i 317 
forhold til overholdelsen af de her internationale konventioner. I stedet for ligesom at overholde 318 
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reglerne i god tro og lægge sig et pænt stykke over, så siger man nej vi skal simpelthen lige ned 319 
og snitte minimumsgrænsen for, hvad der skal til. Problemet er, at når du gør det, så i konkrete 320 
sager, der er sandsynligheden for, at du risikerer at ryge under meget høj. Altså det er lidt det, jeg 321 
vil se som tendensen, mere end at alle er sådan vi er fuldstændig ligeglade, vi ligger den her. 322 
Men man ved, at når man ligger den her, så er der risiko for at du risikerer at få sager imod dig.  323 
I: Men jeg tænker også på altså, er det fordi, at det her efterhånden også er blevet et 324 
sikkerhedspolitisk spørgsmål?  325 
T: Det er der helt sikker nogen der siger. Jeg tror ikke på det af andre årsager. Jeg tror ikke på 326 
det, så du skal ikke spørge mig.  327 
I: Men hvad tror du så årsagen er? 328 
T: Jamen, jeg tror det, jeg vælger bare ikke at bruge ordet sikkerhed, for jeg synes ikke 329 
sikkerhedsteorien kan så meget i forhold til at forklare det, for altså det er jo et akademisk skabt 330 
ord. Det er jo ikke sådan, at det er noget politikerne selv render rundt og siger, jamen det er en 331 
sikkerhedstrussel og de risikerer alle sammen at have bomber med i lommerne. Altså det er jo 332 
det, det handler om national identitet, frygt for kulturel forandring, frygt for økonomisk 333 
forandring i forhold til et velfærdssamfund og alt muligt andet. Og meget tyder så dog på, at der 334 
jo ikke er nogen direkte sammenhæng. Jeg er enig i grundlæggende, at der sker en politisering af 335 
en diskurs på forskellige niveauer fra Folketinget og til forskellige grupper rundt om alle mulige 336 
andre steder, som i stigende grad er præget af, at emnet får et eget liv. At emnet bliver diskuteret 337 
på baggrund af forestillinger snarere end fakta. Der er egentlig ikke rigtig nogen korrelans 338 
imellem, hvornår stramningerne kommer og om der er et meget stort problem eller, altså hverken 339 
i forhold til dansk økonomi eller i forhold til indvandring og asyltal. Det hænger ikke altid 340 
sammen, og det synes jeg er meget tydeligt igennem de sidste 10 år, hvor man nærmest har fået 341 
stramninger af udlændingeloven på samlebånd hvert halve år, og det har jo noget at gøre med 342 
måske, at der er et støtteparti som har skulle gøre sig selv synlige. Så de har fået den, til gengæld 343 
for at de ikke lagde noget i vejen, når det kom til finanspolitik eller EU politik eller så mange 344 
andre områder.  345 
I: Hvis du skal give en generel vurdering af beskyttelsen af flygtninge i dag, hvordan synes du så 346 
det er? 347 
T: Det står til i Danmark? 348 
I: Ikke bare i Danmark, hvis du tænker på folk der flygter, hvad er deres muligheder for at blive 349 
beskyttet under Folkeretten. 350 
T: Juridisk er deres muligheder jo nogenlunde det samme. Altså man kan sige, EU har i enkelte 351 
tilfælde medført en positiv udvikling, i hvert fald regionalt, som man ku håbe at andre lande ville 352 
tage til sig, netop i forhold til dem her, man populært kalder krigsflygtninge, som altså ikke er 353 
omfattet af 1951 konventionen.  Jeg ved ikke om den er værre eller bedre end den var for 10 år 354 
siden globalt set. Det der er ret tydeligt det er, at det er adgangen til asyl i stigende grad bliver 355 
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nægtet i de klassiske asyllande. At især USA, Canada, Australien og Europa gør hvad de kan for 356 
at forhindre, at flygtninge fysisk får adgang til deres territorium eller procesduralt får adgang til 357 
deres asylsystem. Så man har lavet en række åbenbart grundløse procedurer, det startede allerede 358 
i 90’erne og 80’erne i Danmark. Og man er så nu i stigende grad gået i gang med fysisk at 359 
forhindre dem. Nogle gange kobles det så sammen med, at man laver alternative 360 
beskyttelsesløsninger, man prøver at sige jamen så skal vi have mere beskyttelse i 361 
nærområderne. Jeg kan ikke helt se, at de 2 ting opvejer hinanden endnu. Og problemet med det 362 
er sådan lidt dobbelt, for det første giver man måske ikke helt nok penge til, at det helt opvejer 363 
hvor meget kontrol og hvor mange man forsøger at nægte i de klassiske lande. Der vil helt 364 
sikkert også være noget som ikke kan få beskyttelse i nærområderne, som altså har brug for det, 365 
fordi de tilhører etniske mindretal, har særlige behov – medicinske, psykologiske etc. Og 366 
derudover skal man selvfølgelig huske på, at hele flygtningeregimet er designet med sådan idéen 367 
om progressivitet. Alle lande kan deltage og bør i princippet kunne underskrive 368 
flygtningekonventionen, fordi den form for beskyttelse man lover at give til flygtninge, hænger 369 
meget nøje sammen med den udvikling man i øvrigt selv er på i det pågældende land.  Det vil 370 
sige, at de velfærdsydelser du skal gi, skal jo ikke gives, det er jo ikke nå men alle flygtninge 371 
skal have 53.000 kr. Det er noget der er relativt til, hvad for nogle velfærdsydelser der er ret til, 372 
undervisning, ret til boligforsørgelse, der i øvrigt er i det pågældende land. Det gælder også 373 
noget så basalt som f.eks. ytringsfrihed og religion og sådan nogle ting. At det er kun i det 374 
omfang, de lande har det selv, altså at deres egne borgere har det. Men det betyder lidt, at man 375 
kan risikere at gå mod det jeg i mit arbejde kalder idéen om protection light. Altså at ved sådan 376 
strategisk at forsøge at rykke beskyttelsen ud til lande, som har meget lav grad af udvikling og 377 
langt fra så effektive menneskerettighedsstandarder og implementering generelt, jamen så falder 378 
flygtninge altså også ind i det her. Det kan godt være de så får beskyttelse, også i fuld 379 
overensstemmelse med flygtningekonventionen, hvis de er så heldige. Men man skal jo holde sig 380 
for øje, at den beskyttelse også har væsentlig færre kalorier end den tilsvarende beskyttelse ville 381 
ha i f.eks. Danmark. Og det er om muligt den tendens jeg kan se sådan meget negativt. Man kan 382 
selvfølgeligt håbe på, der er også nogle ting der er positive i forhold til sådan, stigende 383 
bevidsthed omkring regional beskyttelse og sådan nogle ting. Men jeg synes simpelthen ikke, at 384 
det opvejer endnu. Og det burde være en ting der gik hånd i hånd med, at man lidt satte et 385 
positivt forbillede i de europæiske lande. Især hvis man altså vil ha de her lande, som jo alle 386 
dage, også tidligere, har huset langt størstedelen af verdens flygtninge, til at tage et yderligere 387 
ansvar og lave bedre regler og sikre bedre flygtningebeskyttelse.  388 
I: det er også fordi jeg tænker, at jeg ku måske forestille mig at det primært er de mere 389 
ressourcestærke flygtninge der ender med faktisk at komme ind til EU, fordi du jo så skal betale 390 
penge til en menneskesmugler osv. 391 
T: Nå ja det er jo selvfølgelig det, men altså det har altid krævet meget at flygte på tværs af 392 
Jorden. Så jo, i dag kræver det penge som du skal samle sammen med din familie og du har en 393 
menneskesmuglerindustri, der vokser hidsigt. Men altså det har jo også krævet både ressourcer 394 
og penge og tage fra Afrika og til Danmark tilbage i 80’erne, selvom kontrollen ikke var ligeså 395 
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skarp. Så der har altid været et eller andet issue der. Men der er ikke nogen tvivl om 396 
selvfølgeligt, at den skærpede kontrol kan også få en effekt i den retning.  397 
I: Efter din vurdering, vil du så sige, at Danmark lever op til deres internationale forpligtelser? 398 
Hvis du altså lige ser bort fra affæren med de statsløse. 399 
T: Nej, det tror jeg ikke jeg vil sige. Jeg synes der er visse punkter hvor det er tydeligt, at vi 400 
opretholder så restriktiv en fortolkning at den i visse sager betyder, at vi ikke lever op til 401 
flygtningekonventionen. Jeg synes, altså man behøver bare kigge på de sidste års kritik fra 402 
menneskerettighedkommitteerne, som selvom man i visse sager så har rettet ind, altså i visse 403 
udlændingesager, så har man ikke gjort noget, så vidt jeg ved, for at sikre sig imod, altså at 404 
ændre reglerne, så man er sikker på, at det ikke sker igen. I den forstand ja, der vil jeg sige, at der 405 
har du et problem, og der lever Danmark ikke op til flygtningekonventionen i forhold til det med 406 
individuel og konkret, i forhold til menneskerettighedskonventionen på de her bredere 407 
beskyttelseshensyn, og de her udsendelsesting. Især dem man vælger at udsende på grund af 408 
sikkerhedsting, fordi vores vurdering af sikkerhed er lavere og måske torturkonventionen. Der er 409 
alle sammen problemer der. Børnekonventionen også.  410 
I: Men når du siger torturkonventionen, tænker du da i forhold til non-refoulment? 411 
T: Ja udsendelsessager ja. Altså det er der, hvor der i hvert fald har været sager ik. At man 412 
risikerer at sende folk tilbage til situationer, hvor de bliver udsat for uværdig eller 413 
nedværdigende behandling. Typisk mindre end hard core tortur, men jo, og så er der også de her 414 
sager hvor vi tror på de her såkaldte diplomatiske garantier. 415 
I: Ja det tænkte jeg på, hvor mange lande gør egentlig det? 416 
T: Det gør mange lande i et vist omfang, men det er jo et vurderingsspørgsmål, altså hvad for 417 
nogle regimer tror man på ik. Og er de her garantier mere værd end det papir, de er skrevet på. 418 
Det er, når man tænker på et land som Irak og andre lande, hvor statsmagten simpelthen ikke kan 419 
garantere, hvad der foregår rund omkring i andre dele af regeringsapparatet eller ude i landet. 420 
Jamen så, hvad fanden skal du så bruge en diplomatisk garanti til.  421 
I: Lever Danmark så op til hvad der står i flygtningekonventionen i forhold til, når du har fået 422 
flygtningestatus. 423 
T: En ting er hvad der står i konventionen, altså fordi ord kan fortolkes i mange retninger. 424 
konventionen i sig selv er jo et relativt kortfattet instrument. Danmark lever efter min mening 425 
ikke op til den principielt korrekte fortolkning af flygtningekonventionen, som den ar udviklet 426 
sig i de lande, som jo har implementeret den, som den ligesom er blevet samlet op af akademiske 427 
eksperter, UNHCR etc. Der må man simpelthen sige, at det er oplagt at det har aldrig været 428 
meningen, at man skulle være singled out når man er forfulgt f.eks., det gir jo ikke mening. Og 429 
det er ret oplagt når man tænker på, hvad for en case flygtningekonventionen opstod på baggrund 430 
af, nemlig jødeforfølgelsen. Altså det svarer, lidt groft sagt, til at man skulle give asyl til de 431 
første 20 jødiske flygtninge men ikke til den million som kom bagefter.  432 
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I: Altså hvis du skulle vælge nogle specifikke ting, som du synes skulle ændres i forhold til 433 
Danmarks asylpolitik, hvad ville det så være? 434 
T: Jeg ville faktisk starte fra bunden. Jeg vil sige, der er nu kommet omkring 65 ændringer af 435 
udlændingeloven siden 83. Det gør at hele udlændingeloven er næsten ulæselig. Rigtig mange af 436 
de her ændringer er kommet på baggrund af enkeltsager, og er kommet meget hurtigt igennem. 437 
Det er jo undtagelser på undtagelser, meget komplicerede regler med alle mulige forbehold, som 438 
gør, at man skal ikke bare være ekspert, man skal være næsten super ekspert for at kunne 439 
navigere rundt i denne her lovgivning uden nogensinde at lave fejl. Det tror jeg desværre også 440 
risikerer at præge embedsapparatet, altså dem der sidder og skal forvalte denne lovgivning. Det 441 
skaber jo usikkerhed og uklarhed både blandt asylansøgere, udlændinge og blandt dem der skal 442 
forvalte reglerne. Jeg vil sige, at når man laver så mange ændringer over så lang tid og alt muligt 443 
andet, så er det på tide nu, og det vil helt klart være min anbefaling, at vi skal have en 444 
gennemskrivning. Vi skal starte forfra, uanset om man ønsker i øvrigt at stramme eller 445 
liberalisere yderligere, så skal man tage at ligesom vende bøtten. Det vil være min første 446 
anbefaling. 2. anbefaling vil selvfølgelig være, at man bringer den på linje med, i først omgang 447 
internationale konventioner, altså primært flygtningekonventionen, det gælder så især det her 448 
med konkret og individuel. Næste anbefaling vil være at man bringer den på linje med, som 449 
absolut minimum, EU’s nuværende asylregler. Det vil sige også i forhold til det her med 450 
konfliktflygtninge. Netop fordi, at det er en oplagt forudsætning politisk, ikke retligt, men 451 
politisk forudsætning for at kunne blive ved at deltage i Dublin-systemet. Og det her med at man 452 
både er lidt med og står lidt uden for, den er svær. Og Norge som jo heller ikke er omfattet af de 453 
fælles asylregler, som har fået lov at være med i Dublin fordi Danmark var det, jamen altså de er 454 
slet ikke i tvivl om, der retter man ind i forhold til det, der kommer af EU regler, fordi ellers har 455 
du ikke legitimitet til at kunne sende asylansøgere frem og tilbage til at kunne blive behandlet i 456 
andre EU lande. 457 
I: Når du siger det her med at vi er nødt til at rette ind i forhold til at være med i Dublin og sådan 458 
noget, hvis det er vi fortsætter på denne her måde, hvilke konsekvenser mener du så, at det vil 459 
have for Danmark? 460 
T: Det kan jo risikere at betyder en situation, hvor altså lige nu skal der jo meget til, f.eks. en 461 
situation som Grækenland, før man stopper med at sende tilbage, men hvis Danmark fortsætter 462 
med at stramme eller at holde sin nuværende stramme politik, og de andre EU lande, som man er 463 
i gang med lige nu, og man er i gang med at forhandle 2. fase af EU’s asylregler, bliver enige om 464 
væsentlig højere standarder og det bliver meget klart, at der er en betydelig forskel på, hvordan 465 
andre EU lande behandler bestemte typer asylsager, hvor Danmark ligesom står henne. Jamen så 466 
kan Danmark risikere at komme i den situation, at andre lande føler, at så kan vi ikke sende 467 
tilbage til Danmark, de har simpelthen for stramme regler eller det er tydeligt, at denne her 468 
person har ret til beskyttelse i resten af EU, men ikke i Danmark, eller har nogle rettigheder i 469 
resten af EU som de ikke vil få i Danmark. Så må man forestille sig, at så vil det politiske pres på 470 
Danmark for at rette ind selvfølgelig vokse. Og det kan betyde, at der enten kan blive lagt noget 471 
politisk pres for, at nu må I simpelthen ændre reglerne eller i sidste ende, at man ligesom vælger 472 
85 
 
at sige, at så kan I ikke have denne her særstatus i forhold til, at I er med i Dublin. Altså enten 473 
eller, og den har vi også lidt på de andre landes nåde, altså vi har fået lov til at få en undtagelse 474 
til forbeholdet på Dublin ik. Så det er jo absolut noget, og det er også derfor, at når der kommer 475 
ændringer i Dublin-systemet så skal vi bare acceptere reglerne uden overhovedet at kny. Vi har 476 
ikke nogen stemmeret, og hvis vi ikke godtager de ændringer der kommer inden for et bestemt 477 
tidsrum, så bliver vi næsten per automatik smidt ud.  478 
I: Men det lyder så lidt på dig som om, at du faktisk tror, at Danmark ender med at have en mere 479 
liberal asylpolitik. Altså bliver tvunget til at gøre det. 480 
T: Jeg tror vi kan komme i den situation, at der vil i hvert fald være et meget kraftigt pres. Om 481 
man ender med at gøre det eller om man tager konflikten, det ved jeg ikke udtale mig om, det er 482 
mere politisk. Men det her vil i hvert fald være mine anbefalinger, hvis man skal leve op til både 483 
internationale regler og regionale regler.  484 
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Appendix 2: Transcription of interview with Peter Skaarup 1 
I = Interviewer 2 
P = Peter Skaarup 3 
 4 
I: Mit første spørgsmål det går på, det er sådan lidt generelt, og det er, at nu er Danmark jo gået 5 
fra at være kendt som et humanitært flygtningeland på grund af loven i 83 og så til at nok have 6 
den strammeste asylpolitik i Europa. Hvad tror du der er årsagen til, at vi har ændret os så 7 
drastisk i forhold til flygtninge. Hvad er rationalerne bag det? 8 
 9 
P: Altså jeg tror, at det der sker, det er nok i virkeligheden, at mange danskere føler ikke rigtigt, 10 
at de er blevet spurgt om den der liberalisering der i 1983. Mange er heller ikke rigtig 11 
opmærksomme på det, fordi det er jo ikke ret hurtigt, at det udvikler sig til et problem. Men 12 
specielt der mod slutningen af 90’erne, der begynder der at komme rigtig mange flygtninge og 13 
familiesammenførte med et retskrav på at få familiesammenføring og flygtningestatus og at få 14 
behandlet deres ansøgning. Og det gør altså, at der begynder at komme en modvilje hos 15 
befolkningen i forhold til, at man ikke rigtig synes, at man er blevet spurgt om denne her 16 
udvikling. Og jeg tror helt grundlæggende, at det er det. Altså, danskerne er jo ekstremt optaget 17 
af at hjælpe mennesker i nød, og det kan vi jo også se, hver gang der er en flygtningekatastrofe, 18 
jamen så er der rigtig mange der giver penge til at hjælpe uanset, hvor det er henne i verden. Og 19 
sådan er det fortsat. Men det, at der over relativt kort tid, kom relativt mange, der var meget 20 
svære at integrere. Og hvor der også var tegn på, at man begik kriminalitet og ikke rigtig ville ud 21 
på arbejdsmarkedet og sådan nogle ting for en relativt stor gruppes side. Det er nok det, der 22 
gjorde udslaget. Og så kom der jo det valg i 2001, hvor der var opbakning til at skifte Nyrup ud 23 
med Anders Fogh. 24 
 25 
I: Ja, efter det er der jo især kommet meget fokus på flygtninge og indvandrere. 26 
P: Ja. 27 
I: Hvad synes du, nu modtager vi jo nogen flygtninge, bl.a. har vi jo kvoteflygtninge, og vi skal 28 
jo også give asyl til dem der kommer til landet og hører under flygtninge konventionen. 29 
P: Ja, ja. 30 
I: Hvad synes du Danmark skal lægge vægt på, når vi modtager flygtninge, hvad er det der er 31 
vigtigt.  32 
P: Altså det vi synes det er, at vi skal hjælpe de mennesker, der virkeligt har brug for hjælp. Og 33 
der synes det rigtigste det er at hjælpe dem, der har stillet sig i kø. Og det er typisk 34 
kvoteflygtningene. Hvor man måske har ventet igennem nogle år, i et flygtningecenter et eller 35 
andet sted, og vil gerne repatrieres lokalt, men det har ikke kunne lade sig gøre af en eller anden 36 
grund. Det er først og fremmest den gruppe, vi skal hjælpe. Og i virkeligheden bør Danmark tage 37 
ud, sammen med FN og finde ud af, hvem er det der har mest krav på hjælp her. Men det der er 38 
sket er jo, at der er rigtig mange, der tager en flyver og dukker op i Københavns lufthavn måske 39 
fra Mellemøsten direkte, eller bliver smuglet op til Danmark gennem det meste af Europa. Og så 40 
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dukker de lige pludseligt op ved grænsen og kræver behandling af deres sag. Altså, det man kan 41 
jo ikke forhindre det fuldstændigt i at ske. Men det har bare gennem årene forvredet vores 42 
udlændingepolitik til, at i for høj grad, synes vi, at bekymre os om den gruppe, der er forholdsvis 43 
privilegerede ved at kunne betale nogen en flybillet og give nogle penge til en menneskesmugler, 44 
der så sørger for de kommer herop. I stedet for, at vi kan hjælpe dem vi så selv siger, at jamen 45 
det er dem, det er præcis dem her, der står næst i køen.  46 
I: Men dem I så vil hjælpe igennem kvoteordningen, vil I så relokere dem til Danmark, som vi 47 
gør nu, eller vil I hellere have, at de bliver i nærområderne? 48 
P: Altså, hvis vi ku bestemme, det kan vi jo så ikke 100 %, fordi vi har nogle konventioner vi er 49 
tilsluttet. Men hvis vi ku bestemme, så tog vi 100 % kvoteflygtninge og undlod at tage andre, og 50 
så blev de hjulpet her i landet den gruppe, vi så tog. Indtil de eventuelt kunne vende tilbage til 51 
deres hjemland, for man kan jo sige, at det der karakteriserer flygtninge er, nogle der har brug for 52 
midlertidig beskyttelse, til de så kunne vende tilbage. Kan de ikke vende tilbage, så skal de 53 
selvfølgelig have lov til at blive i Danmark. Og det har Danmark jo også altid hyldet det princip, 54 
efter Ungarn i 56 og Vietnam og andre krige og konfrontationer rundt omkring i verden. Der har 55 
vi taget et antal til Danmark og hjulpet. 56 
I: Men for dig der tænker du, at flygtninge helst skal være her midlertidigt, hvis det er muligt i 57 
hvert fald. 58 
P: Ja. 59 
I: Har I så sat en grænse for, hvor lang tid I synes man skal være her for, at man ikke kan sendes 60 
tilbage. For man kan jo sige, de kan jo også få startet et liv. 61 
P: Ja nemlig, altså i 2001 der blev tidsgrænsen for at få permanent opholdstilladelse jo ændret fra 62 
3 år til 7 år, så man altså sku ha været her i 7 år, før man fik det. Så ku man så under nogle 63 
særlige omstændigheder få det før tid. Det har vi jo så ændret igen nu her i 2010 til at, reglen 64 
stadig måske er i det lag, men at man godt kan få det før, hvis optjener nogle forskellige point. 65 
Og det er jo typisk sådan noget med, at man kan klare sig på arbejdsmarkedet og har haft job i en 66 
periode. Det tæller positivt, og at holde sig fri af kriminalitet og så altså 7 år, det synes jeg, at det 67 
er sådan en meget god grænse. At hvis ikke man er kommet tilbage inden 7 år, så er 68 
sandsynligheden for, at man skal være i Danmark resten af livet jo stor.  69 
I: Hvad er risikoen så for Danmark for at tage imod flygtninge. Nu tænker jeg for eksempel når 70 
der kommer flygtningestrømme, hvad er risikoen for Danmark? 71 
P: Jeg ved ikke, om der er nogen risiko. 72 
I: Nu tænker jeg, hvis der nu kommer for mange flygtninge eller flere, end der er. 73 
P: Jo jo men det er jo klart, at med kvoteordningen, der har man jo sagt, at man tager omkring 74 
500 og hjælper hvert år ik. Hvis man forestillede sig at man sagde, at det kun er kvoteflygtninge 75 
vi får, så ku man godt tage et større antal. 76 
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I: Men nu tænker jeg i forhold til, at altså der er jo meget fokus på i hvert fald at begrænse 77 
andelen af flygtninge, der får opholdstilladelse i Danmark, netop fordi at der kommer relativt 78 
mange og at der har været en stigning her de sidste par år. Men det er mere i forhold til det, altså 79 
hvad er argumenterne for det. Hvad er det faren er, hvis det er, at der kommer for mange 80 
flygtninge. 81 
P: Nå, men det er igen, at som der var ved at ske der i 98-99,2000, 2001, at der begynder at 82 
komme, de der år begyndte der jo at komme op imod 25000 samlet set af asylansøgere og 83 
familiesammenførte. Og så er vi jo i gang med at lave en så forholdsvis stor påvirkning af vores 84 
befolkning, at det begynder at blive svært at nå integrationen. Og derfor går det også bedre med 85 
integrationen, altså det man kalder beskæftigelsesfrekvensen er jo steget siden 2001 fra ca. 45 % 86 
til 55. Og vi har faktisk lige siddet i denne her aftale nu, og slet til lyd for, at 87 
beskæftigelsesprocenten, for den gruppe, skal op på 65 % i 2020. Og det kan så give 5 mia. 88 
kroner, hvis det lykkes. Og det er jo i virkeligheden det, der kan være problemet, at integrationen 89 
får svært ved at fungere, hvis der kommer for mange, der er meget svære at integrere. Så derfor, 90 
altså for at kunne simpelthen kapere det i vores undervisningssystem, socialsystem osv., så skal 91 
det ikke være et alt for stort antal. Fordi Danmark er ikke sådan et indvandrerland ligesom 92 
England og USA. 93 
I: Men hvad er det så der gør, at det måske kan være en større fare for Danmark i forhold til 94 
nogle af de andre lande. 95 
P: Netop fordi vi ikke er sådan et land, som er bygget på indvandring. Altså vi er jo bygget på, at 96 
vi har en sådan forholdsvis homogen befolkning, som ikke er så særlig stor. Vi er jo så relativt et 97 
lille land geografisk, så på en eller anden måde kan det hurtigt få den konsekvens, at vi ikke 98 
rigtig er herre i egen hus længere, at fokus bliver for stort på at integrere nogle mennesker i en 99 
tid, hvor vi i øvrigt har mange andre ting at slås med, med velfærdssamfundet. Altså, vores 100 
befolkning bliver jo væsentligt ældre i gennemsnit over årene, og dermed mere plejekrævende, 101 
og der er færre på arbejdsmarkedet til at trække læsset. Så skal vi have indvandring, og det skal 102 
vi løbende, så skal det være nogen der kan bidrage, der kan komme ud på arbejdsmarkedet. 103 
I: Men hænger det så meget sammen med, netop som du også siger, at vi har velfærdsstaten. 104 
P: Jamen det gør det da, fordi det er jo forholdsvist anderledes for de lande, som ikke har et 105 
skattebetalt velfærdssystem. Fordi, der kan man sige, at der opfylder man måske mere det, som 106 
liberal alliance taler for. Hvad er det, lukkede kasser åbne grænser eller åbne grænser lukkede 107 
kasser. Altså man vil godt have masser af flygtninge og indvandrere, men man vil ikke betale 108 
noget til dem. Men det er jo svært, når vi har et velfærdssamfund, der jo egentlig bygger på, at 109 
ligeså snart du er kommet ind, inden for døren, så har man ret til hjælp ik. Vi vil jo ikke have, at 110 
der er nogen der ligger og ikke får man eller drikke. Vi vil jo ikke have nogen til at ligge og dø i 111 
rendestenen her i Danmark, og tigge osv. Så det er i virkeligheden det, der sætter os selv lidt 112 
under pres. Og det er jo et positivt pres, for det har vi selv valgt, at vi vil ha sådan et system der.  113 
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I: Synes du, apropos det emne, synes du så at flygtninge der kommer til Danmark, skal have 114 
adgang til de samme ydelser og rettigheder, som danskere har? 115 
P: Altså, det skal de jo have på sigt, men jeg mener ikke nødvendigvis at man fra dag 1, skal 116 
have helt de samme ydelser. Det er også derfor, at vi har lavet denne her starthjælp, hvor man får 117 
en lidt lavere ydelse end kontanthjælpen fra man kommer ind i landet. Og så kan man så, hvis 118 
man har været her i 7 år ud af de sidste 8 år, så kan man så få kontanthjælp, hvis man ikke er i 119 
beskæftigelse. Men altså, der er nogle basale ting, som man skal have. Altså lægehjælp f.eks. ik, 120 
det skal man jo have fra dag 1. 121 
I: Så altså i hvert fald nok til at overleve. 122 
 P: Absolut. 123 
I: Så i forhold til vores internationale forpligtelser. Altså, hvilken indflydelse, for der har f.eks. 124 
været meget kritik fra UNHCR af vores flygtningepolitik og der har også været noget kritik fra 125 
Europæiske organer. Altså, hvilken indflydelse synes I hos Dansk Folkeparti, at FN og EU skal 126 
have i forhold til Danmarks flygtningepolitik? 127 
P: Altså, vi synes jo i virkeligheden, at flygtningepolitikken er noget vi selv skal være herre over. 128 
Altså det der foregår i Danmark, det skal være det danske Folketing, der bestemmer, hvem vi 129 
lukker ind. På internationalt plan, er der ingen tvivl om, at der skal FN have en hovedrolle. EU, 130 
det er vi nok mere, altså der er vi nok skeptiske overfor, om EU reelt kan gøre sådan en stor 131 
forskel. Altså, der synes vi. EU, der er selvfølgelig en del lande som er med efterhånden, men 132 
der er også en del Europæiske lande, der ikke er med i EU. Og resten af verden er jo i hvert fald 133 
heller ikke med i EU. Derfor er det rigtigste sted at den opgave ligger må være hos FN.  134 
I: Men hvad synes du så om Flygtningekonventionen som en reguleringsmekanisme i forhold til 135 
flygtninge. 136 
P: Altså, den er vi jo ikke så forlovet med. Og det, det er simpelthen, det er ikke fordi vi ikke vil 137 
hjælpe flygtninge, altså det er en misforståelse, det tror jeg de fleste danskere vil på hver deres 138 
måde, men det er fordi, at det er en gammel konvention fra 51, som ikke rigtig tager 139 
udgangspunkt i den nuværende tid. Den blev jo lavet, ligesom en del af de andre konventioner, 140 
lige efter 2. Verdenskrig, hvor ja der havde man Øst – Vest konflikten på vej til at komme, og 141 
det var sådan det, der var balancen i de her ting. At man lige efter 2. Verdenskrig ville sørge for, 142 
at der var ro på de fronter der. Men der var jo ikke meget fokus på, hvad skete der i Afrika og i 143 
Mellemøsten på det tidspunkt. Men det er jo Nord – Syd konflikten kan man sige, der er kommet 144 
meget mere fokus på, fordi verden er blevet mindre, og vi transporteres meget mere rund. Og det 145 
vil så sige, at vi har fået rigtig mange velfærdsflygtninge, der kommer til Europa, fordi de jo 146 
søger lykken, ligesom danskerne gjorde det, da de tog til USA for mange år siden, og etablerede 147 
sig derovre. Men problemet er bare, at vi altså har vores velfærdssamfund, som er skattebetalt, 148 
og det bryder sammen, hvis der er for mange der nyder godt af det, uden de har betalt ind til det. 149 
Det er i virkeligheden basis. 150 
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I: Jamen, velfærdsflygtninge er vel i virkeligheden ikke dækket af Flygtningekonventionen, er 151 
de? 152 
P: Nej men, der er jo så mange, der skyder sig ind under at være det. Der smugles hertil og siger 153 
så, eller får af vide af deres advokat, jamen sig nu at du boede det og det sted og at du er udsat 154 
for det og det og det, altså og opfylde betingelsen om, at man skal være personligt forfulgt. Og 155 
for nogen lykkes det jo. Der har været programmer på Danmarks Radio, hvor nogen der har fået 156 
asyl er blevet spurgt nogle år efter, om det var sandt, det de fortalte. Og der har så vist sig, at nej 157 
det var det faktisk ikke. Det var noget de sagde for at få asyl. Og det, det er jo en risiko for, også 158 
opbakningen til at hjælpe flygtninge, at når der er så mange tilfælde af det, så er der mange 159 
danskere der får kolde fødder og siger ahh, der er for meget fup og fidus her.  160 
I: Men synes du så, at Flygtningekonventionen simpelthen er for vag, som den er nu? 161 
P: Jeg synes, den er forældet. Den tager ikke udgangspunkt i udfordringerne her i 2011 og frem. 162 
I: Hvad så når UNHCR kommer med kritik af Danmark, altså hvad er så jeres holdning til det, 163 
hvis man kan sige det sådan? 164 
P: Jamen det er, at selvfølgelig læser vi det igennem og tjekker, om det har noget på sig. Men, 165 
man jo ikke fortænke, at sådan en organisation som UNHCR der har repræsentanter i alle 166 
verdens brændpunkter, og skal hjælpe til, f.eks. nu i det nordlige Afrika her med hvad der sker i 167 
Libyen, Ægypten, Tunesien osv., at den organisation er jo altid interesseret i, at så mange som 168 
muligt, af de her flygtninge, bliver hjulpet. Og kan det lade sig gøre uden, at UNHCR skal alt for 169 
meget indover, men at landene tager flygtninge til de respektive lande, så vil de jo helst det. Så, 170 
vi tager det nok lidt med et gran salt nogen gange, når UNHCR kritiserer Danmark, hvad de har 171 
gjort nogle gange.  172 
I: Ja, fordi det er jo sket et par gange, at de er kommet med en kritik, som i bund og grund er 173 
blevet ignoreret af Danmark. 174 
P: Ja, f.eks. der i Irak, hvor vi sendte nogle tilbage. 175 
I: Ja præcis. 176 
P: Men, det har mange andre lande jo også gjort.  177 
I: Hvad så i forhold til, hvor nu snakkede vi også om kravet om at være individuelt forfulgt. I 178 
forhold til EU, der har de jo ændret kravet, så at f.eks. krigsflygtninge også er dækket. Hvad er 179 
argumenterne imod, at Danmark ligesom retter ind i forhold til EU’s regler? 180 
P: Jeg mener, at argumentet imod er, at det er noget vi selv skal bestemme. Og at Danmark, trods 181 
det at vi er et lille land, yder rigtig meget på det her område til indsatser rundt omkring i verden, 182 
uanset om det er Afghanistan, Iran, Irak, Mellemøsten, Nordafrika nu her. Altså, vi synes nok det 183 
er lidt uretfærdigt, når der er nogen der kritiserer Danmark, fordi vi giver så mange penge, som 184 
vi gør til de her ting. Altså, repatrieringsindsats, hjælp til flygtninge i nærområdet, der er ikke det 185 
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vi ikke giver penge til. Så, vi synes jo, at UNHCR skulle måske fokusere lidt på de lande, der 186 
ikke tager kvoteflygtninge, og ikke tager deres del af ansvaret.  187 
I: Nu har jeg interviewet Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen fra DIIS, og han snakkede noget om, at 188 
der faktisk kan komme en situation, hvor Danmark er nødt til at netop adoptere EU’s politik, 189 
hvis vi fortsat vil være med i Dublin forordningen. Hvad tænker du om det? 190 
P: Det tænker jeg lidt vil være en risiko, hvis vi sku komme dertil, og jeg mener, jeg mener, at 191 
det er noget som regeringen skal stritte imod på forskellig vis, fordi vi jo har et forbehold inden 192 
for retsområdet i EU. Så på grund af forbeholdet mener jeg, at vi kan stå og skal stå udenfor.  193 
I: Hvad så hvis det betyder, at vi ikke kan være med i Dublin? 194 
P: Så må vi jo tage den situation op, hvis det måtte ske og lave måske bilaterale aftaler. Men 195 
altså umiddelbart, så er vi jo ikke kommet dertil så. Jeg tror vi holder fast i det vi hele tiden har 196 
ment der. 197 
I: I Forhold til Folkeretten, hvordan tror du så at forholdet kommer til at være mellem 198 
Folkeretten og nationalstaterne i fremtiden? 199 
P: Det er meget svært at sige, altså det kan udvikle sig i… Nej altså jeg tror, det er jo en løbende 200 
diskussion omkring Folkeretten, og jeg tror altid, at Danmark vil stille sig på Folkerettens side og 201 
være optaget af, at man skal hjælpe, hvor man kan. Så jeg synes ikke vi skal føle os ramt af, at vi 202 
bliver udsat for kritik. 203 
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Appendix 3: Interview guides 
 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
 
Hvordan har du beskrive udviklingen i den danske asylpolitik gennem de senere år? 
Hvorfor tror du den danske asylpolitik har udviklet sig, som den har? 
Hvad er rationalerne bag den nuværende asylpolitik efter din mening? 
Hvad mener du, er de primære problemstillinger ved DK’s nuværende asylpolitik? 
Hvad bør ændres og hvorfor? 
Hvilken indflydelse har det danske EU retsforbehold for den danske asylpolitik? 
Hvorfor er asyl og udlændingepolitikken blevet så stram i Danmark efter din mening?  
Hvad synes du om argumentet at det er nødvendigt med så stram en politik for at beskytte danske 
værdier? 
Hvilken vej tror du udviklingen på området vil gå i fremtiden? 
 
Beskyttelse 
Når man tænker på beskyttelsen af asylansøgere, hvordan vil du så placere den danske 
asylpolitik i forhold til de andre EU landes? 
Adskiller den danske politik sig – hvordan? 
Hvad med de krav som stilles når de har opnået flygtningestatus, hvilken situation mener du, at 
den sætter flygtninge i (herunder pointkrav osv.)  
Hvilken situation er flygtninge i i dag i forhold til faktisk at opnå reel beskyttelse og de 
rettigheder som er beskrevet i Flygtningekonventionen? 
 
Folkeretten 
Hvorfor har det været muligt for Danmark at ”gå imod” anbefalinger fra UNHCR, EU og andre 
organisationer på flygtningeområdet? 
Hvilken position/legitimitet oplever du at Folkeretten har i dag fra et politisk synspunkt? 
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Lever Danmark op til deres internationale forpligtelser efter din mening? Hvorfor/Hvorfor ikke? 
Er de internationale reguleringsmekanismer tilstrækkelige? Eks. Flygtningekonventionen fra 51? 
Kan man gå så langt som at sige at politiske prioriteringer går forud for juraen? – i så fald, 
hvorfor er dette muligt? 
Position for Folkeretten i fremtiden?  
 
Afsluttende 
Hvis du tænker på reguleringen i EU og den stramme politik i DK, hvilke typer af flygtninge når 
så langt nok i systemet til at opnå flygtningestatus? 
Fra et menneskeretligt synspunkt, hvad synes du så man skal være særlig opmærksom på i 
forhold til udviklingen? 
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Peter Skaarup 
 
Flygtningepolitik 
Hvordan vil du forklare udviklingen i Danmark’s flygtningepolitik? 
Hvad synes du der er vigtigt at lægge vægt på, når Danmark skal modtage flygtninge? 
Hvad er risikoen ved at modtage flygtninge? 
Når I taler om at vi skal have en stram udlændingepolitik, adskiller I så indvandrere og 
flygtninge? 
Skal indvandrere og flygtninge have samme vilkår når de kommer til landet? 
Er der noget du gerne vil ændre på i forhold til Danmark’s flygtningepolitik? 
Er asylpolitikken stram nok?  
Hvorfor er det nødvendigt med en stram flygtningepolitik? 
Mener du at flygtninge som får ophold i Danmark skal have adgang til de samme ydelser og 
rettigheder som indfødte danskere? 
 
Folkeretten 
Hvilken indflydelse mener du, at FN og EU skal have på dansk flygtningepolitik? 
Hvad mener du om, at Danmark underlagt FN’s konventioner? 
Hvad tænker du, når organisationer som UNHCR fremsætter kritik af Danmark’s udlændinge- og 
flygtningepolitik? Er kritikken berettiget og bør de i det hele taget blande sig? 
Hvad hvis Danmark er nødsaget til at lempe vores asylpolitik for at forblive i Dublin 
forordningen, hvad mener du så konsekvensen burde være? 
 
Fremtid 
Hvordan tror du forholdet kommer til at være mellem Folkeretten og de nationale love på 
flygtningeområdet i fremtiden? 
Hvordan vil du gerne have forholdet skal være? 
 
